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PREFACE 
  
The Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements document has been prepared 
for use by designers of battery-powered vehicles, portable equipment, and experiments 
intended for crewed spaceflight.  The purpose of the requirements document is to 
provide battery designers with information on design provisions to be incorporated in 
and around the battery and on the verification to be undertaken to demonstrate a safe 
battery is provided.  The term "safe battery" means that the battery is safe for ground 
personnel and crew members to handle and use; safe to be used in the enclosed 
environment of a crewed space vehicle; and safe to be mounted or used in 
unpressurized spaces adjacent to habitable areas. 
 
Battery design review, approval, and certification is required before the batteries can be 
used for ground operations and be certified for flight.   
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CREWED SPACE VEHICLE 
BATTERY SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Purpose and Scope 
 
This requirements document is applicable to all batteries on crewed spacecraft, 
including vehicle, payload, and crew equipment batteries.  It defines the specific 
provisions required to design a battery that is safe for ground personnel and crew 
members to handle and/or operate during all applicable phases of crewed missions, 
safe for use in the enclosed environment of a crewed space vehicle, and safe for use in 
launch vehicles, as well as in unpressurized spaces adjacent to the habitable portion of 
a space vehicle.  The required provisions encompass hazard controls, design 
evaluation, and verification.  The extent of the hazard controls and verification required 
depends on the applicability and credibility of the hazard to the specific battery design 
and applicable missions under review.  Evaluation of the design and verification 
program results shall be completed prior to certification for flight and ground operations. 
 
This requirements document is geared toward the designers of battery systems to be 
used in crewed vehicles, crew equipment, crew suits, or batteries to be used in crewed 
vehicle systems and payloads (or experiments).  This requirements document also 
applies to ground handling and testing of flight batteries.  Specific design and 
verification requirements for a battery are dependent upon the battery chemistry, 
capacity, complexity, charging, environment, and application.  The variety of battery 
chemistries available, combined with the variety of battery-powered applications, results 
in each battery application having specific, unique requirements pertinent to the specific 
battery application.  However, there are basic requirements for all battery designs and 
applications, which are listed in section 4.  Section 5 includes a description of hazards 
and controls and also includes requirements.   
 
The following definitions differentiate between requirements and other statements. 
 
Shall:   This is the only verb used for binding requirements.  
Should/May:  These verbs are used for stating non-mandatory goals or when used in 
the italicized text herein refer to best practice methods which can be 
construed as example methods for meeting the requirement it refers to. 
Will:   This verb is used for stating facts or declaration of purpose.  
 
Section 6 includes chemistry-specific information.  No requirements appear in that section, 
only best practices. 
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Shall requirements are summarized in Appendix E. 
 
In keeping with the NASA standards template, italicized text is intended to indicate 
rationale, best practice examples, or guidelines; while the italicized text never includes the 
requirement, it often helps to convey the intent of the requirement.  
 
In cases where a requirement includes associated italicized text and that text includes best 
practice, that best practice can be considered part of an accepted means to address the 
requirement.  If other methods are used, rationale and supporting data demonstrating the 
adequacy of those methods should be presented and must be reviewed for adequacy by 
the program’s technical team.   
 
1.2 Responsibility and Change Authority 
 
The responsibility for the development of this document lies with the Propulsion and 
Power Division at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC).  Change authority resides with 
the Propulsion and Power Division. 
 
1.3 Battery Design Evaluation and Approval 
 
To be compliant to the requirements herein, every battery design, along with its safety 
verification program, its ground and/or on-orbit usage plans, and its post-flight 
processing shall be evaluated and approved by the appropriate technical review panel 
in the given program or project.  Center and program specific examples of the review 
and approval process can be found in Appendix D. 
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2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
 
2.1 Applicable Documents 
 
Document 
Number Document Title 
JPR 1700.1 JSC Safety and Health Handbook 
JSC-STD- 8080 JSC Design and Procedural Standards  
JSC 25159 Toxicological Hazard Assessments on Batteries used in 
Space Shuttle Missions 
JSC 66548 Requirements for Flight Certification and Acceptance of 
Commercial Off the Shelf Lithium Ion Batteries  
JSC 26895 Guidelines for Assessing the Toxic Hazard of Spacecraft 
Chemicals and Test Materials 
49 CFR 173.185 Transportation Requirements for Lithium Cells and 
Batteries 
JWI 8705.3 Battery Processing 
SSP 52005 Rev. 
C 
Payload Flight Equipment Requirements and Guidelines for 
Safety-Critical Structures 
SSP 50021 Safety Requirements for ISS Program 
SSP 41172 Qualification and Acceptance Environmental Test 
Requirements for Space Station 
SSP 51700 Payload Safety Policy and Requirements for the 
International Space Station (ISS) 
SSP 30599 Safety Review Process International Space Station 
SSP 50038 Computer Based Control System Safety Requirements 
NASA-STD-5019 Fracture Control Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware 
NASA-STD-3001 NASA Space Flight Human-System Standard 
ANSI/AIAA  
S-080-1998 
Space Systems - Metallic Pressure Vessels, Pressurized 
Structures, and Pressure Components 
NPR 8705.2B Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems 
NSTS 1700.7B 
ISS Addendum 
Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the 
International Space Station 
AWS 
C7.4/C7.4M:200
8 
Process Specification and Operator Qualification for Laser 
Beam Welding 
NASA-STD-5020  Requirements for Threaded Fastening Systems in 
Spaceflight Hardware 
PRC-0009D Resistance Spot Welding of Battery and Electronic 
Assemblies 
UL 840 Insulation Coordination Including Clearances and Creepage 
Distances for Electrical Equipment 
NASA-STD-
8739.4 
Crimping, Interconnecting Cables, Harnesses, and Wiring 
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J-STD-001ES Space Applications Electronic Hardware Addendum to  
J-STD-001E 
NASA-STD-
8739.1A 
Workmanship Standard for Polymeric Application on 
Electronic Assemblies 
MIL-STD-1686 Electrostatic Discharge Control Program for Protection of 
Electrical and Electronic Parts, Assemblies and Equipment 
IPC-6012C-2010 Qualification and Performance Specification for Rigid 
Printed Boards 
 
2.2 Reference Documents 
  
This section lists those documents that may aid in the understanding or clarification of 
the specification.  
 
Document 
Number Document Title 
NPR 8705.4 Risk Classification for NASA Payloads 
JSC 26626A EVA Hardware Generic Design Requirements 
JSC 26549 JSC Manual for Control of Program Stock 
JSC 26943 Guidelines for the Preparation of Payload Flight Safety 
Data Packages and Hazard Reports 
JSC 61360 Engineering Directorate Certified Parts Approval Process 
(EDCPAP)  
EP-WI-031 Specification for Acceptance Testing of  
Commercial Lithium Ion Cell Lots 
SMC-S-016 Test Requirements for Launch, Upper Stage and Space 
Vehicles 
JSC 66217 Specification for Lot Testing and Flight Screening of Canon BP 927 and BP 930 Lithium-ion Batteries 
EP-WI-014  
Rev. B 
Specification for Acceptance Testing of Commercial Nickel 
Metal Hydride (NiMH) and Nickel Cadmium (NiCd) Cells  
ISS_EP -03 EP5 Battery Design Evaluation Form 
Form 1298 Flight Payload Standardized Hazard Control Report 
ESTA-OP-049 
Ver. D 
Lithium Battery Handler Certification 
P32928-103 Requirements For International Partner Cargoes 
Transported on Russian Progress and Soyuz Vehicles 
JSC 50835A ISS Pressurized Volume Hardware Common Interface 
Requirements Document 
NESC-RP-08-
00492  
Assessment of Risks and Mitigation Strategies for the use 
of Lithium-ion (Li-ion) Long Life Batteries (LLB) 
MSFC-STD-531 High Voltage Design Guide 
JSC 29129 STS Orbiter Upgrades Program – Electrical Auxiliary Power 
Unit (EAPU) Corona Design Guideline 
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SSP 30309 Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Requirements 
Document 
CCT-STD-1140 Crew Transportation Technical Standards and Design 
Evaluation Criteria 
CCT-REQ-1130 ISS Crew Transportation and Services Requirements 
Document 
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2.3 Order of Precedence 
 
This is a safety requirements document.  Wherever there is conflict between this and 
reference documents, the following hierarchy applies: 
 
1. Program-level documentation/specifications (International Space Station (ISS), 
Commercial Crew, etc.) 
2. JSC Engineering Directorate documentation/specifications 
3. This document 
4. Any other document/specification cited herein 
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3. ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
3.1 Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
A amperes (current) 
AC Alternating Current 
Ag/Zn Silver-zinc 
AgO Silver (II) oxide 
Ag2O silver (I) oxide or monovalent silver oxide 
Ah ampere-hour 
ARC Accelerating Rate Calorimetry 
AVT Acceptance Vibration Test 
°C degrees Centigrade 
CCV Closed Circuit Voltage 
Cd(OH)2 Cadmium hydroxide 
CFE Contractor Furnished Equipment 
CID Current Interrupt Device 
COTS Commercial Off the Shelf 
C rate or C Charge/discharge rate based on the nameplate capacity of 
the cell 
CT Computed Tomography 
DC Direct Current 
DFMR Design for Minimum Risk 
DoD Depth of Discharge 
DOT Department of Transportation 
DPA Destructive Physical Analysis 
ESTA Energy Systems Test Area 
°F degrees Fahrenheit 
G Gravitational Constant 
g2/Hz Measurement of Vibration Amplitude 
GEO Geosynchronous Earth Orbit 
GFE Government Furnished Equipment 
GSE Ground Support Equipment 
HAZMAT Hazardous Material 
ISRP ISS Safety Review Panel 
ISS International Space Station 
JF JSC Form 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
KOH Potassium hydroxide 
LEL Lower Exposure Limit 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
Li-BCX  Lithium-bromine chloride complex 
LiBOB Lithium bisoxalato borate 
LiBF4 Lithium tetrafluoroborate 
LiCFx Lithium polycarbon monofluoride 
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LiFeS2 Lithium iron disulfide 
Li-MnO2 Lithium manganese dioxide 
LiPF6 Lithium hexafluorophosphate   
Li-SO2 Lithium-sulfur dioxide 
Li-SO2Cl2 Lithium-sulfuryl chloride 
Li-SOCl2  Lithium-thionyl chloride 
Li-ion Lithium-ion 
mAh milliamp-hours 
MCMB Mesophase Carbon Micro Beads 
MOSFET Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Transistor 
NDE Nondestructive Evaluation 
NiCd Nickel-cadmium 
NiH2 Nickel-hydrogen 
NiMH Nickel-metal hydride 
NiOOH Nickel oxyhydroxide 
NPR NASA Procedural Requirement 
NSTS National Space Transportation System 
OCV Open Circuit Voltage 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 
PAN Polyacrylonitriles 
PbO2 Lead dioxide 
PSRP Payload Safety Review Panel 
PTC Positive Temperature Coefficient 
PVC Polyvinyl chloride 
PVDF Polyvinylidene Di-fluoride 
QVT Qualification Vibration Testing 
SDS Safety Data Sheet 
SLA Sealed Lead Acid 
SO2 Sulfur dioxide 
SOC State of Charge 
STS Space Transportation System (Space Shuttle) 
UL Underwriters Laboratory 
V Voltage, in volts 
VRLA Vent Regulated Lead Acid 
Wh watt-hour 
 
3.2 Definitions 
 
Activation:  The process of making an assembled cell functional, either by introducing 
an electrolyte, by immersing the cell into an electrolyte, or by any other means dictated 
by the cell manufacturer. 
 
Active material:  The material contained in the electrodes of a cell or battery that takes 
part in the electrochemical reactions of charge and discharge. 
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Aging:  Permanent loss of capacity due to repeated cycling or passage of time during 
nonuse. 
 
Anode – (negative electrode):  Gives up electrons to external circuit and is oxidized 
during the electrochemical reaction of discharge. 
 
Available capacity:  The total capacity, ampere-hour (Ah) or watt-hour (Wh), that will be 
obtained from a cell or battery at defined discharge rates and other specified discharge 
or operating conditions (including temperatures). 
 
Battery (also termed battery pack):  Interconnected modules, including all ancillary 
subsystems for mechanical support, thermal management, and electronic control. 
 
C rate:  The discharge or charge current, in amperes, expressed as a multiple of the 
rated capacity in ampere hours. 
 
Capacity:  The total number of ampere-hours or watt-hours that can be withdrawn from 
a fully charged cell or battery under specified conditions of discharge. 
 
Catastrophic failure mode: An event that results in the death or permanent disability of a 
crew member or passenger, or an event results in the unplanned loss/destruction of a 
major element of the crewed space system that could potentially result in the death or 
permanent disability of a crew member or passenger. 
 
Cathode – (positive electrode):  Accepts electrons from the circuit and is reduced during 
the electrochemical reaction of discharge. 
 
Cell (also termed battery cell):  An assembly of at least one positive electrode, one 
negative electrode, and other necessary electrochemical and structural components.  A 
cell is a self-contained energy storage device whose function is to deliver electrical 
energy to an external circuit. 
 
Cell bank:  A grouping of interconnected cells in a parallel arrangement, into a single 
mechanical and electrical unit. 
 
Certification:  The result of the qualification and design review process, often 
documented by memorandum or completion of requirement verification list, table, or 
document specific to the end item being certified. 
 
Charge acceptance:  The willingness of a battery or cell to accept charge.  It may be 
affected by cell temperature, charge rate, and state of charge (SOC). 
 
Closed circuit voltage (CCV):  The difference in potential between the terminals of a cell 
or the voltage measured when the circuit is under an electrical load. 
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Concentration polarization:  Polarization caused by the depletion of ions in the 
electrolyte at the surface of the electrode. 
 
Conditioning:  Cyclic charging and discharging of a battery to ensure that it is fully 
formed and fully charged.  Also carried out when a battery is first placed into service or 
returned to service after prolonged storage. In some cases, this may involve deep 
discharging as in the case of NiCd or NiMH. 
 
Cutoff voltage:  The cell or battery voltage at which the discharge is terminated.  Also 
called end voltage. 
 
COTS battery:  Original equipment manufacturer (OEM) battery designed to power 
commercially available (or COTS) equipment.  Examples include cameras, laptops, 
tablets, power tools, etc. 
 
Custom battery:  Any battery designed for the purpose of powering non-COTS 
applications.  It is designed with either COTS or custom cells. 
 
Cycle testing:  Repetitive charge discharge tests performed to demonstrate rate 
performance capability or verify continued operability after completing acceptance 
testing. 
 
Depth of discharge (DOD):  Ratio of the quantity of electricity (in amp-hours or watt-
hours) removed from a cell or battery on discharge to its rated capacity. 
 
Electroformation:  Term used to describe the conversion of the material in both the 
positive and negative plates to their respective active materials.  Also called ‘formation’. 
 
End voltage:  The prescribed voltage at which the discharge (or charge, if the end-of-
charge voltage) of a cell or battery should be terminated per the application or the 
manufacturer’s specification/recommendation. 
 
Fast charge:  A rate of charging that returns full capacity to a rechargeable battery, at a 
rate higher than the nominal rate recommended by the cell/battery manufacturer. 
 
Flooded cell:  A cell design that incorporates an excess amount of electrolyte. 
 
Forced discharge:  Discharging a cell or battery below zero volts causing voltage 
reversal. 
 
Formation:  Electrochemical processing of a battery plate or electrode that transforms 
the active materials into usable form. Also referred to as ‘electroformation’. 
 
Gassing:  The evolution of gas from one or more of the electrodes or the electrolyte in a 
cell.   
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Internal resistance:  The opposition to the flow of electric current within a cell or battery 
expressed as the sum of the ionic and electronic resistances of the cell components. 
 
Life:  For rechargeable batteries, the duration of satisfactory performance, measured in 
years (calendar or shelf life) or in the number of charge/discharge cycles (cycle or 
service life).  For primary batteries, the duration of satisfactory performance measured 
in years (calendar or shelf life) or the period of performance under load (service life). 
 
Memory effect:  A phenomenon in which a cell, operated in successive cycles to less 
than full DoD, experiences a depression of its discharge voltage and temporary loss of 
the rest of its capacity when cycled again at normal voltage levels. 
 
Module:  A grouping of interconnected cells in series and/or parallel arrangement into a 
single mechanical and electrical unit. 
 
Open circuit voltage (OCV):  The difference in potential between the terminals of a cell 
or the voltage measured when the circuit is open (no-load condition). 
 
Overcharge:  The forcing of current through a cell after all of the active material has 
been converted to the charged state.  Charging continued after 100-percent SOC is 
achieved. 
 
Over-discharge:  To discharge a cell or battery past the point where the full capacity has 
been obtained. 
 
Nominal voltage:  The reported or reference voltage of the cell/battery, also sometimes 
referred to as the “normal” voltage of the cell/battery. 
 
Oxygen recombination:  The process by which oxygen generated at the positive plate 
during charge is reacted at the negative plate. 
 
Prismatic cells:  A cell fabricated typically with flat plate electrodes, which are stacked to 
provide capacity. 
 
Rated capacity:  The number of ampere-hours a cell or battery can deliver under 
specific conditions (rate of discharge, end voltage, temperature), usually, the 
manufacturer’s rating. 
 
Shape change:  Change in shape of an electrode due to migration of active material 
during charge/discharge cycling. 
 
Shelf life:  The duration of storage under specified conditions at the end of which a cell 
or battery still retains the ability to give a specified performance. 
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Starved electrolyte cell:  A cell containing little or no free liquid electrolyte.   
 
State of charge (SOC):  The available charge capacity in a cell or battery expressed as 
a percentage of rated capacity. 
 
Taper charge:  A charge regime delivering moderate- to high-rate charge current when 
the battery is at a low SOC and tapering the charge current to lower values as the 
battery reaches its end-of-charge voltage. 
 
Thermal runaway:  A condition whereby a cell or battery overheats and reaches very 
high temperatures in very short periods (i.e., seconds) through internal heat generation 
caused by an internal short or due to an abusive condition.  The temperature of the cell 
or battery is uncontrollable at this point. 
 
Trickle charge:  A charge at a low rate, balancing losses through a local action and/or 
periodic discharge, to maintain a cell or battery in a fully charged condition. 
 
Unactivated shelf life:  The period of time, under specified conditions of temperature and 
environment, that an unactivated cell or battery can be stored before deteriorating below 
a specified capacity. 
 
Wet shelf life:  The period of time that a cell or battery can stand in the charged or 
activated condition before deteriorating below a specified capacity. 
 
Working voltage:  The typical voltage or range of voltage of a cell or battery during 
discharge. 
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4. GENERAL BATTERY REQUIREMENTS 
 
The following sections address general technical requirements intended to ensure safe 
outcomes in NASA battery deployments, addressing issues related to design, 
manufacture, qualification, and acceptance.  
 
4.1 Methodologies used in Ensuring Safe Outcomes 
 
A key aspect of ensuring safe outcomes is the approach taken to control hazards.  The 
following section addresses the prescribed strategies: failure tolerance and Design for 
Minimum Risk (DFMR).   
 
4.1.1 Failure Tolerance 
 
Failure tolerance is the basis of the NASA safety approach.  This method is applied in 
all safety evaluations unless it can be proven that a failure tolerance approach is not 
feasible. 
 
a. Battery systems for crewed spacecraft shall implement failure tolerance as the 
preferred approach to control all catastrophic hazard causes. 
b. The level of failure tolerance shall be the product of an integrated design and 
safety analysis but be a minimum of one. 
As an example, to be considered two-fault tolerant, a battery design should be capable 
of maintaining safe operation or incur a safe shutdown after the imposition of the failure 
of any two mutually independent catastrophic hazard control measures or features.   
For the purposes of fault tolerance discussions, NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 
8705.2B, “Human Rating Requirements and Guidelines for Space Flight Systems,” 
defines “catastrophic event” as one resulting in the death or permanent disability of a 
crew member or passenger or an event resulting in the unplanned loss/destruction of a 
major element of the crewed space system during the mission that could potentially 
result in the death or permanent disability of a crew member or passenger.   
Fault tolerance for batteries should consider the toxicity as well as the energy content.  
This takes into consideration the causes resulting in leakage, rupture, electrical shock, 
fire, and explosion hazards.   
Note that SSP 30309 provides the requirements for the safety analysis and risk 
assessment for the ISS. 
 
4.1.2 Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) 
 
Some potentially catastrophic hazards cannot practically be controlled using failure 
tolerance and are exempted from the tolerance requirement provided the risk they pose 
is mitigated to the maximum practical extent through a defined process in which 
JSC-20793 Rev D 
14 
See cover for full disclosure. Verify correct revision before use at 
https://qmsmasterlist.jsc.nasa.gov/Home.aspx/Organization/31. 
approved standards and margins are implemented to account for the absence of failure 
tolerance.  Herein, this process is called DFMR.   
 
a. The DFMR approach shall be used to address catastrophic battery hazards that 
cannot practically be controlled by a failure tolerance approach.   
NPR 8705.2B, “Human Rating Requirements and Guidelines for Space Flight Systems,” 
recognizes that some potentially catastrophic hazards cannot be practically controlled 
using failure tolerance and are exempted from the tolerance requirement provided they 
are controlled through a defined process in which approved standards and margins are 
implemented to account for the absence of failure tolerance.  Herein, this process is 
called DFMR. 
DFMR is a process that relies on the application of mature/proven technology, robust 
design margins, and accepted standards for manufacturing, inspection, analysis, test, 
and operational measures to mitigate the potential for failures that cannot be controlled 
by failure tolerance.  When a DFMR approach is used, technical authorities accept that 
the process has demonstrated the risk of catastrophic hazards has been minimized to 
the maximum practical extent. 
A risk matrix may be used to demonstrate that the applied methods have reduced the 
probability of occurrence and/or the severity of the hazards to an acceptable level for 
the intended use. 
This approach to hazard control takes advantage of existing acceptable processes and 
best practices.   Guidance and recommendations for acceptable processes and best 
practices are given in Sections 5.0 and 6.0 and in the appendices.  If other methods are 
used, rationale and supporting data demonstrating the adequacy of those methods 
should be presented.   
Examples of the kinds of battery failures that might employ DFMR include leakage and 
internal short.  Many battery or cell designs become impractical with the implementation 
of triple containment to be two-fault tolerant to catastrophic electrolyte leakage.  
Similarly, the imposition of three layers of separators between anode and cathode to be 
two-fault tolerant to catastrophic cell internal short circuits hazards in many cases can 
severely degrade performance.  
For the purposes of streamlining the battery design approval, some simple battery 
designs below certain low energy and voltage thresholds as specified in Sections 4, 5 
and 6 herein also can use the DFMR approach for hazard control. 
 
4.1.3 Risk Classification 
 
Three levels of risk classifications have been defined for battery systems included in this 
specification.  Threshold limits are defined based on contained energy and experience 
with specific manufacturing methods and cell formats.  Safety of crew, vehicle, and 
mission may be a factor in selecting the appropriate classification.  For systems which 
do not confirm with established limits, the next higher level of classification is 
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recommended.  Threshold limits are defined for each chemistry in Section 6 of this 
document.  Risk classes are defined as: 
 Non-Critical – the lowest level of hazard control is reserved for low energy cells 
and battery designs for which standard emergency procedures are written and 
practiced.  Batteries within this ‘Non-Critical’* classification shall be: 
o Low energy < 4 Wh per battery pack where each battery is thermally and 
electrically isolated (or < 60Wh for Alkaline Primary Batteries) where Watt-
Hours (Wh) = Cell Capacity (Ah) × Cell Voltage (V), and 
o Rated with a toxicological level of 1 or 2, and 
o Contained within a not intentionally sealed compartment, and 
o Meet one the following criteria for its chemistry: 
 Alkaline Primary Batteries - Alkaline (non-rechargeable) cells in 
sizes D or smaller with a maximum of 12 V and/or 60 Wh and with 
cells either all in series or all in parallel and with no potential 
charging source and with the cells located in a vented 
compartment.  Silver oxide cells are considered within this 
category. 
 Lithium-ion Secondary Batteries – COTS (rechargeable) lithium-ion 
button, cylindrical, or pouch batteries of up to 1000 mAh capacity.  
Battery is defined as one cell or a packaged or unpackaged 
assembly of two or more cells. 
 Lithium Primary Batteries - COTS (non-rechargeable) lithium button 
cells (only Li-MnO2, Li-CFX and LiFeS2) of up to 1000 mAh 
capacity.  
 Nickel Cadmium Batteries - Nickel-cadmium (rechargeable) 
batteries and cells of up to 1000 mAh capacity. 
 Nickel-Metal Hydride Batteries - Nickel-metal hydride 
(rechargeable) silver oxbatteries and cells of up to 1000 mAh 
capacity. 
 Silver-Zinc Batteries - Silver-zinc (rechargeable) batteries and cells 
of up to 1000 mAh capacity. 
 Zinc-Air Primary Batteries - Zinc-air (non-rechargeable) batteries 
and cells of up to 1000 mAh capacity. 
 Note: For primary cells, rated cell capacity is defined as the 
maximum stated capacity per cell product data sheet 
 Critical – the intermediate level of risk classification requiring single fault 
tolerance typical of commercial devices manufactured in high volumes for the 
global consumer.  Batteries within this ‘Critical’* classification shall be one of 
these chemistries and do not meet the ‘Non-Critical’ classification: 
o Lithium Ion Secondary Batteries – COTS (rechargeable) lithium ion of less 
than 20 V and 60 Wh 
o Nickel Cadmium 
o Nickel Metal Hydride 
o Silver Zinc 
o Alkaline Primary 
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o Lithium Primary 
o Zinc-Air 
 Catastrophic – the highest level of risk classification requiring two fault tolerance 
typical of custom, high energy, or high power designs. 
 
* Note:  The term “non-critical” described within this section differs in context and 
is not to be confused with the ISRP hazard severity definitions of “critical 
hazards” as defined within SSP 30599, SSP 50021, and SSP 51700. 
 
4.2 Key Aspects of Engineering Evaluation, Qualification, and Acceptance 
Testing 
 
The thorough nature of NASA’s test regime from early engineering evaluation, through 
qualification, and ultimately to acceptance testing is a key aspect in the Agency’s safe 
use of batteries in its missions.  The following section specifies general requirements in 
those areas and provides references to additional best practices.   
 
Application of the requirements in this section is dependent on risk classification.  The 
italicized text provides guidance for requirement application to critical and non-critical 
battery systems. 
 
JSC 66548 can be used as an example for the flight certification and acceptance of 
COTS lithium-ion batteries that details the level of testing required under the 
engineering, qualification, flight acceptance, and lot sample testing of COTS lithium-ion 
batteries. 
 
4.2.1 Engineering Evaluation 
 
This section addresses the preliminary evaluation of safety and performance features at 
both the cell and battery level and would include the evaluation testing of prospective 
cells before their selection for use in a flight battery.  Engineering evaluation commonly 
includes abuse test protocols intended to assess safety and performance features 
necessary for the battery design. 
a. Cell and battery designs considered for flight shall first undergo evaluation testing 
to characterize the performance and safety of the flight battery design.  
b. Evaluation testing shall, at a minimum, consist of characterizing the cell and 
battery safety under abuse conditions of overcharge, over-discharge into 
reversal, external short circuit and cell internal short circuit, temperature 
tolerance, vent and burst pressure determination and for critical/catastrophic 
batteries (See 4.1.3) perform  cell destructive physical analysis.  
c. Evaluation testing shall confirm manufacturer’s specifications that are relevant to 
the project, as well as confirm that the cell and/or battery design can handle 
unique requirements levied by the project.  
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In the case where safety features at the cell level are rendered less effective when the 
cells are assembled into the battery, abuse testing at the cell level and then 
subsequently at progressive levels of assembly evaluates the effectiveness of these 
features.   
 Establish a baseline characterization of thermal signature (calorific output as a function 
of temperature) for cells being used in custom batteries.  Accelerating Rate Calorimetry 
(ARC) is one such method. 
Cell designs used in custom batteries should be examined by a combination of 
computed tomography and destructive physical analysis (DPA) (tear down) to assess 
quality of manufacture and absence of defects. 
When performing battery safety tests that simulate abuse conditions, the mechanical 
and thermal environment of the test article should be representative of conditions 
expected during normal use. 
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4.2.2 Qualification Testing 
 
This section addresses the qualification testing of the flight battery. 
 
a. Qualification testing shall be performed to the worst-case relevant flight 
environments with margin. 
The qualification sample of batteries should be randomly sampled from units 
from the flight lot that have passed acceptance testing.  
b. Environmental tests shall include, at a minimum, extreme temperature 
exposures, vacuum, and vibration tests. 
The margin used for qualification tests will be provided by the respective projects or 
programs or from SSP41172 for ISS environments.  Appendix A may be used as a 
guideline for qualification vibration tests (QVTs) for cells and batteries if there are no 
project-provided environments.  The margin proposed here should be consistent with 
the program’s margining policies.  In the event none are provided, as a guideline, 6 db 
above the maximum expected is typically used.  
The qualification of the battery should include testing the batteries to environmental and 
vibration levels that are higher than the mission requirements.  The number of flight 
missions that the batteries will be used for, along with the location of the battery in the 
spacecraft, should determine the period and level of vibration.  As a minimum, the 
qualification test program should include the following:   
1. Functional baseline test (open circuit voltage (OCV), mass, capacity or load 
check, internal resistance, visual inspection). 
2. Vibration to qualification levels. 
3. Functional baseline test recheck. 
4. Charge/discharge cycles (for rechargeable batteries) or a load test (for primary 
batteries) at 20 degrees Fahrenheit (°F) margin above and below worst-case hot 
and worst-case cold, respectively.  
5. Functional baseline test recheck. 
6. Vacuum (approx. 0.1 psi) or equivalent leak checks.  
7. Functional baseline test recheck. 
For batteries used in a pressurized volume or environment, exposure to a vacuum 
environment (approximately 0.1 psi) for a minimum of 6 hours should be carried out.  
For batteries used in an unpressurized volume or environment, thermal vacuum cycles 
must be performed with the deep vacuum levels below 1 × 10–4 Torr (instead of the 0.1 
psi used for habitable volume/pressurized environments).  Alternatively, the thermal 
cycles and vacuum environment tests can be performed independently. 
If the acceptance test vibration levels and spectra used to screen cells for 
manufacturing defects are not enveloped by the mission vibration levels, a separate 
qualification for acceptance vibration test (AVT) should be performed to verify that the 
screening levels do not degrade cell reliability. 
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The qualification batteries should pass all cell and battery acceptance tests as 
described in Section 4.2.3 prior subjecting them to qualification tests. 
For custom battery designs, safety (abuse) testing performed during engineering 
evaluation should be repeated at qualification with pass/fail criteria for the qualification 
tests determined based on information derived during engineering evaluation. 
c. Flight cell lot destructive testing shall consume a randomly selected sample size 
that is, at minimum, 3 percent of the flight lot size or three cells, whichever is 
greater for each destructive test. The destructive test sample size need not 
exceed 350 cells. 
This is to adequately populate the test matrix necessary to confirm critical safety 
and performance characteristics, especially those features that are critical for 
mission and crew safety.  For COTS batteries, cells can be obtained from the 
disassembly of a sample from the battery flight lot.  To achieve statistically 
significant results, all initial destructive tests must be populated with a minimum 
of three cells. The maximum sample size was established to define as a 
reasonable limit. 
d. The operation of cell safety devices, if used as a control at the battery level, shall 
be verified by a qualification test at the battery level or at a level that accurately 
simulates the level at which the control is required to confirm the operation of the 
safety device. 
The pass/fail criteria for these qualification tests should be established after 
engineering evaluation tests are completed. 
e. To verify cell manufacturing quality does not vary within the lot, cell lot 
destructive testing shall include a minimum of 3 randomly selected cells (or 3 
cells from 1 randomly selected COTS battery) that has passed cell (or battery) 
acceptance screening.  
The cell/battery should be downgraded from flight class to uncontrolled class 
prior to the DPA. Supporting the DPA with a prior CT scan examination is 
recommended. The pass/fail criteria for the DPA should be established after the 
engineering DPAs are completed.  Variation of components and methods used in 
cell construction can be detected by DPA and are grounds for lot rejection. 
f. Qualification testing shall be performed at the battery level, using flight equivalent 
builds. 
Multiple qualification units may be used to run different tests in parallel.  Tests 
may be re-sequenced to accommodate schedule and resource constraints as 
long as the intent of the test is not compromised. 
Battery designs deemed non-critical need only provide verification evidence as required 
to complete the Unique Hazard Report for the subject battery system.   
4.2.3 Acceptance Testing 
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This section addresses the acceptance testing of the flight battery. 
 
a. Cell lots intended for custom flight batteries shall undergo 100-percent 
acceptance screening that includes, at minimum, visual inspection of bare cell 
with shrink wrap removed if present, mass, OCV retention, alternating current 
(AC) and direct current (DC) resistance.  
Work Instruction EP-WI-031 provides an example of OCV retention screen. 
b. Batteries intended for flight shall undergo flight acceptance (nondestructive) 
testing, which will include an evaluation of OCV, mass, capacity (for 
rechargeable chemistries) or load check (for primaries), internal resistance, 
visual inspection, vibration to flight acceptance levels, and thermal/vacuum 
testing. 
As a minimum, the flight acceptance test program should include the following:   
1. Functional baseline test (OCV, mass, capacity (for rechargeable chemistries or 
load check for primaries), internal resistance, and visual inspection). 
2. Vibration to flight acceptance levels (see Appendix A for more details). 
3. Functional baseline test recheck. 
4. Vacuum (approx. 0.1 psi) or equivalent leak checks.  
5. Functional baseline test recheck. 
For batteries used in a pressurized volume or environment, exposure to a 
vacuum environment (approximately 0.1 psi) for a minimum of 6 hours. 
For batteries used in an unpressurized volume or environment, thermal vacuum 
cycles must be performed with the deep vacuum levels below 1 × 10–4 Torr 
(instead of the 0.1 psi used for habitable volume/pressurized environments). 
Alternatively, the thermal cycles and vacuum environment tests can be 
performed independently. 
Details of recommended flight acceptance tests are provided under each battery 
chemistry section in Section 6 with a detailed example in Section 6’s lithium-ion section.  
For those chemistries not listed in Section 6, early consultation with program technical 
staff is recommended.  
Battery designs deemed non-critical need only provide cell verification in the form of UL 
(or similar) certification data or acceptance test results, battery system functional 
performance, and verification of hazard control features. 
 
4.3 Manufacturing Quality 
 
This section contains quality related provisions on the manufacturing lot and is intended 
to outline certain key aspects of manufacturing quality. 
 
4.3.1 Configuration Control 
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Custom cell and battery designs intended for flight shall only be procured from vendors 
with configuration control processes approved by the NASA or International Partner 
program. 
 
Configuration control is adequate when the manufacturer maintains documentation that 
enables control and replication of all tools, fixtures, machines, instruments, settings, 
environmental conditions, contaminant mitigation measures, materials, and pass/fail 
criteria for the production of a unique cell/battery design.  This includes periodic 
independent verification of the certificates of compliance and/or analyses to meet 
required specifications for composition, impurities, and properties of materials and 
components.  Configuration control requires complete two-way traceability, which is 
defined as documentation that demonstrates a solid chain of custody from incoming 
materials to final assembly and vice versa.  
 
Custom and critical battery system designs should have independent material 
verifications by the cell manufacturer or customer (NASA or NASA contractor).  Non-
critical battery designs can rely on UL certification or international standard verification 
to insure configuration control.  In no situation is the manufacturer specification sheet a 
viable form of cell performance verification. 
 
4.3.2 Subsequent Flight Lot Testing 
 
Some applications could require additional lots of flight batteries/cells beyond the 
original lot that was acceptance tested, qualified, and approved for flight.  Key safety 
features must be retested to be sure that the new cell lots are performing like the 
previous qualified lot. 
 
a. Any new COTS battery lot and/or cell date code shall require a repeat of all 
battery and/or cell lot qualification testing and mitigation measures specified in 
Section 4.2.2. 
An exception can be made for COTS cell batches delivered with two date codes 
that represent consecutive days if it can be verified the two days spanned a 
single production run. 
 
b. Subsequent flight cell lot destructive testing shall confirm that subsequent lot 
performance and safety features are the same as that of the original qualification 
lot. 
A key purpose of this repetition is to gain confidence that configuration control of the 
manufacturing process is still effective and that the new cell lots are performing like the 
previous qualified lot.  For example, if a cell internal fusible link is used as a control for 
external short circuit hazards, sample cells from each subsequent lot should be tested 
to confirm that the fusible link works as expected.  
Lot sample testing is carried out to confirm that the safety tolerances of the 
cells/batteries remain the same compared with the original lot.  A statistically significant 
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number of cells/batteries should be randomly selected for lot sample testing and should 
be based on the flight program, the number of cells manufactured, the period between 
manufacturing of the lots, the original materials that go into the manufacturing of a 
single lot, etc.  A 3- to 6-percent sample size has been used for past flight battery 
programs. 
For cell designs with configuration control, subsequent flight lot destructive testing can 
consist of a reduced set of lot sample testing but should include computed tomography 
(CT)/DPA, capacity (primary), 100-percent depth of discharge (DoD) cycle life 
(rechargeable), ARC or similar method (lithium), short circuit, and overcharge 
(rechargeable). 
4.4 General Design Requirements 
 
The following design requirements are general in nature.  They are generally applicable 
to all battery builds.  
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4.4.1 Electrical Interconnection 
 
The solid interconnection of cells to make up the battery is crucial in preventing ohmic 
heating, which would result in reduced performance and/or life and may result in a 
hazardous overheating of cells within the battery. 
 
a. The electrical interconnections that form the pack through the interconnection of 
cells shall be made of low-resistance connections such that ohmic heating at the 
design load presents no over-temperature hazard. 
b. The means of interconnection (i.e., mechanical fasteners, tack weld, etc.) and its 
verification shall ensure that the flight environments and usage profile do not 
reduce the effectiveness of the connection.  
In the case of bus bar interconnections via threaded fasteners, flight vibration as well as 
thermal variation over the course of the load profile would tend to loosen the 
connection.  Torqueing requirements coupled with fastener locking features are 
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the connection throughout the mission 
(reference NASA-STD-5020, “Requirements for Threaded Fastening Systems in 
Spaceflight Hardware,” for best practices). 
 
4.4.2 Electrical Wiring 
 
The integrity of wire and the insulation used within the battery must be ensured. 
 
a. Wiring used within the flight battery shall adhere to Electrical Wire and Cable 
Acceptance Tests described in JSC-STD-8080.5 E-24 or be certified via an 
equivalent standard.  
 
4.4.3 Lithium-ion Battery and Cell Monitoring 
 
For lithium-ion batteries, monitoring of key parameters such as cell/battery voltages, cell 
temperature, and battery/string current is necessary to ascertain health and maintain 
safe operation of the battery.  Monitoring of pertinent parameters may show adverse 
trends in the state of health and can be essential to investigating failures within the 
battery. 
 
a. For custom or COTS batteries with catastrophic failure modes due to cell 
under/over voltage, monitoring shall be provided in order to detect and control 
hazardous under/over voltage of any cell in the battery. 
The requirements here seek to strike a balance between monitoring required for 
safety and the reliability of the battery and accompanying instrumentation.   
b. For custom or COTS batteries with catastrophic failure modes due to high 
currents, battery-level current monitoring shall be provided in order to detect and 
control hazardous currents in the battery. 
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c. For custom or COTS batteries with catastrophic failure modes due to high/low 
temperatures, temperature monitoring shall be provided to detect and control 
hazardous temperatures at any cell in the battery.  
Optimal number and placement of the temperature sensors to provide adequate 
coverage for all cells should be based on high-fidelity thermal analysis for 
nominal and off-nominal conditions. 
d. For custom battery designs with catastrophic failure modes, instrumentation shall 
collect data during use and during charge and be reviewable on the ground for 
use in trending and/or post anomaly analysis. 
The requirements above focus on key measurements and time periods for 
monitoring.  For example, a requirement to monitor key parameters even when not in 
use (i.e., on the shelf) may be prohibitive (i.e., may drive a monitoring system that is 
self-powered and self-contained within the battery) and yield other adverse 
effects.  Similarly, for the purpose of trending, it is acceptable to only monitor/record key 
parameters before, during, and after each charge to increase simplicity and reliability 
the battery for the discharge phase.  
 
4.4.4 Cell Matching 
 
Cell performance matching for selection into batteries is a useful practice in custom 
battery builds when done in addition to cell acceptance screening specified in Section 
4.2.3b. 
 
a. For custom batteries with catastrophic failure modes, cell performance matching 
prior to battery assembly shall be performed to mitigate state-of-charge (SOC) 
imbalances that could adversely affect battery performance and/or safety. 
b. For custom batteries with catastrophic failure modes, cells shall be matched in a 
battery based on charge retention, internal resistance and/or AC impedance, and 
ampere-hour capacity (for rechargeable chemistries). 
The requirements above prescribe a matching protocol intended to select from the 
acceptance screened lot of cells.  These requirements are not a remedy for poor lot 
uniformity.  Note that cell matching and the use of balancing circuits should not be 
rationale for accepting lots with poor cell lot uniformity, which indicates a less 
controlled manufacturing process and may indicate product with a higher likelihood 
of rapid degradation of field performance.  
 
4.4.5 Dissimilar Controls  
 
For battery chemistries with catastrophic failure modes due to excessive charge or 
discharge (including external short circuit), software-based controls to mitigate these 
hazards are more and more common.  These controllers manage the charging and 
discharging of the battery within safe parameters and can be located in the battery 
charger, the power distribution system, and/or the battery itself. 
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a. For custom batteries with catastrophic failure modes, software-based controls 
responsible for managing the charge/discharge of the battery shall operate inside 
a safe envelope maintained by active or passive hardware-based controls and 
guards. 
b. For custom batteries with catastrophic failure modes, in cases where software-
based controls are not enveloped by hardware controls, the software is safety 
critical and its development shall include conventional software assurance 
processes and confidence not based solely on integrated testing.  
Where computer based controls are used, applicable safety requirements (SSP 
50038) will need to be met. 
 
4.5 Mission Usage 
 
a. During the preparation phase for on-orbit processing, the hardware owner shall 
provide details for safe operation of the hardware on-orbit, any on-orbit 
processing that may be required, and safe stowage or disposal. 
b. The hardware owner shall establish on-orbit processes and operational 
constraints in coordination with the mission controllers for the hardware.   
Provide on-orbit processes that may include procedures for hardware inspection 
and checkout that are required prior to on-orbit usage of the equipment. 
Provide procedures to dispose of depleted cell(s) and batteries and replace them 
if the battery-powered applications are designed for on-orbit replacement. 
Provide procedures for recharging, re-installing, and storing rechargeable cells 
and batteries if the application is designed for rechargeable cells or batteries. 
Provide procedures to remove, visually inspect, tape, and bag depleted or 
discrepant cells and battery packs and place them in dry trash.  
NOTE: For cells and batteries that are returned as trash on Russian vehicles, the 
requirements given in P32928-103, "Requirement for International Partner 
Cargoes Transported on Russian Progress and Soyuz Vehicles," are followed. 
Crew members should record anomalies during any phase of battery use from 
installation and usage through removal/recharge to storage/disposal. 
c. For the custom lithium-ion battery designs that are designated as catastrophic 
(see 4.1.3) and required to be used in a crewed environment for more than 1 year 
or for multiple missions requiring launch and landing, the health of the battery 
shall be monitored to allow insight into changes that could lead to a catastrophic 
failure.  
The long-term physical and chemical changes associated with the cells and 
internal construction of the batteries are not typically fully understood when a 
custom-designed battery is flown for space application; hence, it is imperative to 
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monitor the health of the battery.  Techniques such as thermography when the 
battery is under load can provide information on bad welds or electrical 
connections; unique discharge loads with a high current pulse inserted to provide 
internal resistance measurements can also provide a warning to changes that 
may lead to a catastrophic failure.  
A fleet leader may be provided on ground to monitor and characterize the health 
and physical appearance of the battery.  The fleet leader should have storage 
and operating time and cycles, with margin, in excess of the flight units to provide 
confidence that any anomalous behavior may be detected prior to occurring in 
flight. 
 
4.6 Post-flight Cell and Pack Evaluation 
 
a. A post-flight performance evaluation of the hardware and the batteries shall be 
conducted when hardware is returned post-flight.   
b. For cells and batteries installed in hardware during return flight, after the post-
flight evaluation, the cells and battery pack shall be removed so that the 
equipment may be stored without the cells and pack installed.  
An exception is made for coin cells that provide memory storage for hardware.  
Cells providing memory storage need not be removed unless performance 
degradation has been noted, the shelf life has expired, or signs of damage or 
corrosion are evident.   
For additional information, battery storage is defined in JSC 26549, “JSC Manual for 
Control of Program Stock.”  Details regarding the process for post-flight removal of cells 
or battery packs are provided in JWI 8705.3. 
 
4.7 Ground Processing Requirements 
 
Battery systems intended for crewed spacecraft must maintain safety during ground 
handling, transportation, and ground operations.  While this document contains a 
number of items that should be considered to ensure safety of ground battery 
operations and handling, the subset listed in this section is considered necessary and 
contains requirements to ensure safe operation. 
 
a. The hardware developer or provider shall establish protocols and controls to 
address identified hazards and document those processes in the safety data 
package prepared for the system.  
b. Battery system transportation shall be in accord with domestic and international 
regulations. 
 
4.7.1 Requirements for Ground Handling and Transportation 
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a. Sufficient ventilation shall be provided when processing non-sealed batteries to 
ensure that the concentrations of electrolyte vapors, combustible gases, or toxic 
gases do not reach 50 percent of the lower exposure limit (LEL).   
b. Ground handling and transportation shall be in accordance with JPR 1700.1, 
“JSC Safety and Health Handbook,” or equivalent standards. 
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Ground handling and transportation best practices include:  
a. Battery test benches and tables should be coated with electrolyte-impervious 
coatings.  
b. The battery test areas should have a designated eye wash station and shower.  
c. Shock sensors should be installed on containers transporting cells and batteries 
(typically classified as Hazardous Material (HAZMAT) Class 9 by 49 CFR).  
d. Temperature sensors should be installed on containers transporting cells and 
batteries (typically classified as HAZMAT Class 9 by 49 CFR). 
 
JWI 8705.3, “Battery Processing.” contains excellent guidance regarding ground 
handling. 
 
4.7.2 Design and Operations Requirements for Ground Support Equipment 
 
Ground support equipment (GSE) consists of the non-flight systems, equipment, or 
devices (with a physical or functional interface with flight hardware) necessary to 
routinely support the operation of transporting, receiving, handling, assembly, 
inspection, test, checkout, and servicing of flight hardware. 
 
a. GSE for batteries shall be designed such that the combination of the battery and 
GSE does not reduce the level of failure tolerance intended in the flight battery 
design.  
Equipment used to test or charge batteries should have redundant controls in 
place, including dissimilar redundancy to prevent hazards due to malfunction of 
test equipment. 
Best practices in GSE design include but are not limited to:  
a. The polarity of GSE connecting to battery terminals should be keyed.  
b. For external chargers, the specification document for the charger should be used 
as guidance for the build and test procedures. 
c. COTS GSE should not be modified without GSE manufacturer’s 
recommendations and approval.  
d. All test equipment, especially those interfacing with flight batteries, should be 
calibrated periodically as required by the equipment manufacturer.  Verification of 
calibration should be confirmed before the start of test so that no calibration will 
be required during the test program.  
e. Test protocols programmed into the GSE should have tolerance ranges for all the 
parameters used for charging or operation. 
f. Test protocols programmed into the GSE should have design limits specified for 
the test parameters.  
g. Test protocols programmed into the GSE should have safety limits specified for 
the test program.  
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h. The test equipment should be designed with limits that prevent restart of 
equipment or continuation of the test in the event of power, test equipment, or 
battery failures. 
i. Safety devices and mandatory verification steps should be incorporated into the 
GSE designs and handling/operating procedures, especially where failure 
tolerance is not met by the battery system alone. 
j. GSE should be verified to operate safely prior to connecting a battery to it.  
k. Uninterrupted power supply should be provided for all GSE that involves critical 
testing, such as testing of flight batteries.  
l. Battery test equipment should be internally protected against short circuits.  
m. Battery test equipment should not impose short circuits on the test article.  
n. Access to emergency eye wash, shower, or combination units for the battery 
charging and conditioning area should not be obstructed and should be no more 
than 25 feet distant or 10 seconds travel time from the battery test area.  
o. Personnel involved with handling, testing, installing, or any other battery-related 
operations should be trained as required in the specific battery chemistry safety.  
Test team personnel should receive daily briefings on the tasks to be carried out 
each day with an emphasis on safety.  
p. All battery storage should be in accordance with the manufacturer’s specification 
and Safety Data Sheets (SDS). 
q. A Lith-X or Class ABC fire extinguisher, as required per the SDS of the batteries, 
should be available in the test location. 
 
4.8 Shelf and Service Life Related Requirements 
 
a. Shelf and service life of batteries shall be tracked.  
Appendix C provides further details on the shelf life and service life of various 
commonly used cell chemistries. 
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5. GENERAL BATTERY HAZARDS AND CONTROLS 
 
Potential hazards and safe design requirements are discussed in this section.  Hazard 
sources are identified, hazard manifestations are explained, and hazard prevention and 
control requirements are presented.  Not all controls will apply to all battery designs; 
hence, thorough identification of hazards and controls is required to prove design 
safety. 
 
At minimum, fire/explosion, chemical exposure, electrical shock, and touch temperature 
are battery hazards to crewed spacecraft and crew.  
 
Requirements: 
 
a. The possible sources of battery hazards shall be identified for each battery 
design while considering the entire set of mission phases and conditions. 
b. Each hazard shall be evaluated to determine applicability and to identify all 
sources, which can be broadly categorized as inadequate design, poor 
workmanship, and/or abuse (electrical, mechanical, and/or thermal).   
See Section 6 for details of chemistry-specific battery hazard sources. 
c. The hazard severity shall be categorized as catastrophic, critical, or non-critical.  
 
5.1 Fire/Explosion Hazard 
 
Fire and/or explosion hazards can result from the generation and ignition of a 
combustible gas mixture, evolution of large quantities of free gases, or initiation of a 
runaway internal reaction in a cell (thermal runaway).  Excessive internal pressure 
(either within cell or battery enclosure) can result in failure of cell and/or battery seals 
and cases.  Cell and/or battery contents can then be expelled from the cell, either slowly 
or forcibly.  Shrapnel fragments from violent cell or battery enclosure bursting can cause 
damage upon impact to personnel, structure, or equipment. 
 
5.1.1 Sources – Chemical Reaction 
 
1. Some batteries generate hydrogen and/or oxygen while discharging and/or 
charging.  Hydrogen gas, mixed with air or oxygen, is flammable and/or explosive 
over a concentration range of 4 percent to 75 percent by volume in air.   
2. Many aqueous electrolyte cells subjected to charging will generate oxygen as the 
charge nears completion, providing oxygen where none may have existed 
previously, such as in a battery container that had been purged with nitrogen to 
flush away oxygen.   
3. Accumulation of gases in a sealed cell or battery case can build up pressure 
within the case. 
4. A plugged or faulty pressure relief valve in a cell or battery enclosure. 
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5. Electrolysis of aqueous electrolyte on ground paths into hydrogen and oxygen, 
creating an explosive gas mixture. 
6. Vaporization and decomposition of flammable electrolytes to form flammable 
gases or aerosols. 
5.1.1.1 Requirements – Chemical Reaction 
 
Flammability 
 
a. Design of the hardware shall limit accumulation of hydrogen in enclosed spaces 
containing oxygen to less than 2 percent of the total free-space volume.  
The traditional means of avoiding hydrogen accumulation is to provide 
continuous air ventilation at a rate sufficient to dilute evolved hydrogen below 2.0 
percent, which gives 100-percent margin below the 4-percent flammability level.  
Wherever a flammable and/or explosive mixture of hydrogen and oxygen may 
exist, an ignition source is presumed to exist because the energy required for 
ignition of stoichiometric hydrogen and oxygen mixtures is only on the order of 1 
to 2 microjoules.   
b. Electrolyte absorbing materials used in battery designs shall be nonflammable or 
flame retardant.  
Electrically conductive battery parts should be insulated to protect against a 
flammability hazard if the absorbent material could trap flammable electrolyte 
against those conductive battery parts. 
The volume of void spaces inside the battery case that cannot be eliminated by 
design should be filled with electrolyte-resistant nonflammable filler, such as 
potting material or electrolyte absorbent material.  Fillers limit the volume and 
mass of gases that can accumulate prior to venting, thus limiting the force of any 
gas explosion.  
 
Venting of Battery Enclosure 
 
c. The battery enclosure and cells shall prevent excessive pressure buildup due to 
gas accumulation.  
A venting feature is a designed opening or an intended weak point that will 
release below an intended pressure.  A relief valve is a mechanism designed to 
open at a specified pressure and may or may not reseal after the pressure is 
released. 
Depending on the cell chemistry and cell case, the venting feature may need a 
liquid impermeable, gas permeable covering to trap electrolyte while venting 
gases.   
Cell vents or relief valves should not be blocked or plugged with the application 
of potting materials that would prevent them from venting safely. 
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d. Relief valves and vents used as controls for the accumulation of excessive 
pressure shall be tested. 
Cell vents should be tested in a flight-like mechanical configuration to verify that 
they operate correctly at the designed pressure. 
Relief valves on battery enclosures should be tested after installation to verify 
that they operate correctly at the designed pressure. 
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Burst of Pressurized Battery Chemistries 
 
e. If the battery cell enclosure failure mode is demonstrated to be leak-before-burst, 
then the ratio of failure pressure to vent pressure shall be a minimum of 1.5:1. 
A test of relief-valve-equipped cells and battery cases should disable the relief 
function and then apply an internal pressure equal to 1.5 times the relief valve 
maximum vent pressure.  There should be no detectable leak.    
Leak-before-burst: A design concept in which potentially critical flaws will grow 
through the wall of the pressurized hardware and cause pressure-relieving 
leakage rather than burst (catastrophic failure) at maximum design pressure. 
f. All other cell enclosures shall demonstrate a minimum ratio of failure pressure to 
vent pressure of 2.5:1. 
g. Cells that do not meet the 1.5:1 ratio shall not be used for manned space 
applications. 
Batteries with pressurized metallic cells that exceed an internal pressure of 100 
psi are classified as special pressurized equipment and must meet the leak-
before-burst failure mode, demonstrate a minimum factor of safety for the design 
burst to maximum design pressure of 1.5:1 and follow acceptance and 
qualification test requirements as called out in ANSI/AIAA S-080-1998, “Space 
Systems – Metallic Pressure Vessels, Pressurized Structures, and Pressure 
Components.” 
For fracture control, batteries are unique forms of pressurized containers. 
Batteries and battery systems can be classified as non-fracture-critical by 
meeting one of the following: 
1. Non-hazardous leak-before-burst design. 
2. The pressure of the sealed container is less than 689.5 KPa (100 psia); 
the sealed container does not contain a hazardous fluid; and loss of 
pressure in the system will not result in a catastrophic hazard. 
3. Small batteries that fall under the noncritical category (see 4.1.3) are 
exempt from fracture control. 
Otherwise, the requirements of NASA-STD-5019, “Fracture Control 
Requirements for Spaceflight Hardware,” must be addressed. 
 
5.1.2 Sources – Overcharge Failure/Over-discharge Failure 
 
1. Failure of charge control devices such as smart chips, feedback loops, switches, 
temperature sensors, and timing devices. 
2. Inadvertent charging of primary/nonrechargeable batteries. 
3. Improper design of a device containing both a battery and an additional power 
source that also contains a battery (primary or secondary) which unintentionally 
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creates a current path that can lead to inadvertent transfer of charge between the 
two sources.  
4. Improper charging device or method. 
5. Increase in cell imbalance caused when batteries with unbalanced cells in series 
are charged and discharged, which leads to further variations in cell voltages 
and/or capacities with service life.  This can lead to inadvertent over-discharge of 
one or more cells in a string, potentially causing the weak cells to go into a 
voltage reversal (over-discharge) condition.  
6. Circulating currents between parallel-connected cell stacks resulting from 
lowered voltage in one or more stacks due to cell or insulating material 
degradation, followed by current flow from adjacent electrically sound stacks as a 
result of the difference between stack potentials.  
 
5.1.2.1 Requirements - Overcharge Failure/Over-discharge Failure 
 
a. The battery/charger design shall maintain required failure tolerance against 
overcharge/ over-discharge failure. 
b. Operational procedures shall ensure that the battery is not operated outside 
limits recommended by the cell/battery pack manufacturer or that established 
during qualification testing.  
c. The charger shall be designed for the specific type of battery being used and 
incorporate the necessary charge termination controls.  
Charge termination criteria usually vary with battery chemistry. 
d. Inadvertent charging of primary batteries shall be prevented. 
For batteries with cells or cell strings that should not be charged (as in primary/ 
nonrechargeable batteries), redundant serial blocking diodes should be installed 
in each parallel leg of a battery consisting of primary cells to prevent circulating 
currents between parallel cells or cell stacks, unless tests show these currents 
cannot present catastrophic failure modes.  Small Schottky diodes have been 
used for this purpose to minimize voltage drop.  
e. Uncontrolled charging of secondary batteries shall be prevented. 
f. Charger circuit schematic shall be reviewed and evaluated for required failure 
tolerance.   
g. For external chargers, the specification document for the charger shall be used 
as guidance for the development of in-flight charging procedures.  
h. If it can lead to a hazardous condition, the charger shall be designed to stop 
charging the battery after a set period of time to prevent continuous balancing 
charge discharge loops. 
i. Operational tolerances of the charger shall not exceed the safe operating range 
of the cell or battery.  
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j. Operational protocols programmed into battery chargers used on spacecraft shall 
have safety limits specified. 
 
5.1.3 Sources – External Short Circuit 
 
1. External to battery short circuit sources:  
a. Bridging at the power or sense voltage connectors 
b. Bridging with the power (charging), load, or voltage sense cables 
c. Bridging at the battery load, charging source, or voltage monitor 
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2. Internal to battery but external to cell short circuit sources: 
a. Faulty bussing/cell interconnect insulation 
b. Faulty wiring insulation 
c. Conductive electrolyte leakage path 
d. Conductive condensation or water intrusion path 
e. Faulty cell-to-cell electrical isolation 
f. Faulty cell-to-structure electrical isolation 
g. Conductive contaminant bridge 
3. Circulating currents due to corona arcing between poorly insulated conductive 
surfaces in high-voltage batteries while exposed to low pressures. 
 
5.1.3.1 Requirements – External Short Circuit 
 
a. External shorts to the battery shall be controlled using a combination of 
preventive controls.    
External shorts are normally prevented using insulative barriers and current 
limiters. Insulative barriers include well-insulated connectors with adequate 
separation between positive and negative battery pins, adequate cable 
insulation, insulation between internal cell terminals and the battery case, 
insulation between banks of series cells, etc.  
Circuit interrupters that are rated well below the battery's peak current source 
capability should be installed in the battery power circuit.  Interrupters may be 
fuses, circuit breakers, thermal switches, PTCs, or other effective devices.  
Circuit interrupters (as one of several design constraints on limiter sizing) such as 
fuses should be rated at  
200 percent of the maximum load to be provided by the battery in order to avoid 
nuisance trips.  Circuit interrupters other than fuses should be rated at a value 
that is equal to or lower than the maximum current that the cell is capable of 
handling without causing venting, smoke, explosion, fire, or thermal runaway.   
Since the battery case is usually grounded/bonded to the structure, the 
interrupters should be in the ground (negative) leg of a battery where the 
negative terminal is connected to ground.  Where the circuit is “floating,” as in 
plastic battery cases used in those for portable electronic devices, the circuit 
interrupters can be placed in either leg.  In either case, the circuit interrupters 
should be placed as close to the cell or battery terminals as the design will allow 
to maximize the zone of protection.  
The cell and battery maximum continuous and pulse current-carrying capability 
dictated by worst-case operating conditions should be confirmed by testing to 
verify that the battery remains safe under those conditions and that the current 
limiter(s) have been properly selected to clear short circuits while avoiding 
nuisance trips.  
b. Controls for battery external shorts shall be tested at the appropriate and relevant 
battery configuration in the relevant environment.  
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The appropriate configuration and environment is critical during the test, as 
factors such as thermal gradients, heat dissipation paths, heat transfer, as well 
as the current-carrying capability of the interconnects and cells vary with battery 
design as well as with environment (e.g., temperatures, pressurized versus 
unpressurized environments, etc.). 
The smart external short (external to the battery) circuit test uses an impedance 
in the external circuit that is set just below the limits of the current limiters in the 
battery pack design, such that the battery tolerances are tested under maximum 
stress conditions.  
c. The battery packs shall be tested for shorts (bypassing all battery level current 
limiters) of the low and high impedance types and provide protection controls 
accordingly.   
Cell level safety controls may not work effectively, as safety controls at the 
battery level may become a hazard cause themselves.  Hence, testing in the 
relevant configuration and environment is critical to understanding the worst-case 
hazards.  For example, cell-level controls such as positive thermal coefficient 
(PTC) current limiting devices should be characterized by test and should be 
shown to be effective at the cell and appropriate string or bank level before the 
flight design is completed as a part of the engineering evaluation described in 
section 4.2.1.  The appropriate configuration and environment is critical during 
the test, as factors such as thermal gradients, heat dissipation paths, heat 
transfer, as well as the current-carrying capability of the interconnects and cells 
vary with battery design as well as with environment (e.g., temperatures, 
pressurized versus unpressurized environments, etc.). 
Low impedance shorts, also known as hard shorts, are short circuits of the lowest 
possible impedance in the external circuit that can be applied during test.  
Cables, connectors, and instrumentation are all designed to minimize impedance 
applied to the battery pack under test.  
A high impedance short (smart shorts external to cell but internal to battery) 
occurs inside the battery that has been determined to be a worst-case condition 
(determined by analysis and engineering evaluation test) for the battery pack as 
the cell response falls outside the purview of the protective devices.   
Cell level controls such as PTC current limiting devices should be characterized 
before the flight design is completed.  PTC device limitations should be 
characterized using tests and should be shown to be effective by testing at the 
cell and appropriate string or bank level. 
Absorbent material should be provided to absorb any condensation that may 
occur due to widely varying temperature changes.  Such condensation on 
conductive surfaces within the battery could lead to a short circuit. 
d. The surfaces of battery terminals on the outside of the battery case shall be 
protected from accidental bridging. 
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This may be accomplished by using a scoop-proof female connector, recessing 
stud-type terminals, installation of effective insulating barriers, etc. 
e. All inner surfaces of metal battery enclosures shall be anodized and/or coated 
with a non-electrically conductive electrolyte-resistant paint to prevent a 
subsequent short circuit hazard. 
f. Battery and cell terminals shall be protected from contact with other conductive 
surfaces.   
Examples include potting the terminals with room-temperature vulcanizing (RTV) 
silicone or other nonconductive sealants or by isolating the terminals with a 
nonconductive barrier.  Leaked electrolyte is also a conductor that can be a 
cause of a short. 
g. Battery terminals that pass through metal battery enclosures shall be insulated 
from the case by an insulating collar or other effective means. 
h. Wires inside the battery case shall be insulated, restrained from contact with cell 
terminals, protected against chafing, and physically constrained from movement 
due to vibration or shock.   
This should be verified by inspection of each final battery assembly before it is 
completely sealed.  The qualification unit should be inspected after vibration and 
shock testing. 
Standards for electronic circuit board workmanship, wire crimping, interconnect 
cables, harnessing, wiring, soldering of electrical and electronic assemblies, 
electrostatic discharge control for protection of electronic components and 
assemblies, and qualification and performance specification for rigid printed 
boards should be followed per the documents listed in Section 2.1.  
Controls should be verified by carrying out the insulation/isolation resistance 
test.   
The isolation resistance divided by the maximum working voltage of the circuit 
under test should be at least 100 ohm/V (UL 840 or IECEC60068-2-30). 
i. Adjacent insulative barriers such as layers, wraps, and coatings shall be unlike in 
design and material properties. 
Unlike examples are nonflammable paper, plastic shrink wrap, durable tape, 
fiberglass, penetration resistant layers, etc.  Select only electrolyte resistant or 
compatible materials that can withstand worst-case mission temperature 
extremes inside the battery. 
j. In battery designs greater than 50 Vdc, corona-induced short circuits (high-
voltage-induced gas breakdown) shall be prevented. 
Corona can be mitigated by proper design and material selection (reference 
MSFC-STD-531).  If higher voltages and low operating pressures are anticipated 
or if a single failure (leak) can lead to low operating pressures, testing should be 
performed to verify corona design mitigations.   
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5.1.4 Sources – Internal Short Circuit Failure 
 
Catastrophic internal shorts are generally rare events but can be very violent and 
damaging.  Demonstrating tolerance to all external shorts does not imply 
achieving tolerance to all internal shorts.  There are no tests that fully screen for 
the possibility or the severity of outcome for an internal short circuit of an 
individual cell.   
 
Although thermal runaway has been attributed in some cases to internal shorts, it 
is difficult to prove that this was the cause due to the loss of evidence after such 
an event.  Although difficult to prove after an event, this phenomenon has been 
well studied with simulated internal shorts in a research environment using 
different methods.   
 
Internal shorts can occur in two ways:  
1. Poor quality control of the cell manufacturing process that allow impurities 
and contaminants to be present as latent defects inside the cell, which can 
later pierce the separator causing an internal short circuit that can result in 
electrolyte leakage, fire, and thermal runaway.  
2. Cells used beyond their specifications, such as charge and discharge 
rates beyond the manufacturer's recommended limits; exceeding 
maximum charge current, end-of-charge, or end-of-discharge voltages; or 
exceeding operational temperature environments. 
In lithium ion rechargeable batteries, these deviations can cause the 
deposition of dendritic deposits of lithium during charge and  of copper 
after a dissolution and deposition during over-discharge which may cause 
separator damage.  If these dendrites create an internal short circuit, 
localized temperature rise due to localized high current flow through the 
internal short circuit can lead to eventual thermal runaway and fire due to 
the flammability of the electrolyte.   
All cell chemistries and cell designs are susceptible to internal shorts.  However, 
not all internal shorts result in a thermal runaway.  If thermal runaway occurs 
during cell abuse testing (see Section 4.2.1.b), then the cells are referred to as 
intolerant of internal shorts.  In general, most lithium-based cell chemistries are 
prone to catastrophic internal shorts, while those with aqueous electrolytes are 
not.     
 
Sources of internal cell short: 
 
1. Induced via charge/discharge and temperature abuse, which can cause 
the deposition of metallic dendrites of copper and/or lithium upon cycling, 
leading to separator stress to the point of failure 
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2. Separator defects or damage during manufacture or assembly 
3. Electrode defects (e.g., metallic burrs) and/or degradation 
4. Tab/lead defects or inadequate isolation 
5. Misalignment of electrodes and separators during winding/stacking. 
6. Impurities or contaminants 
7. Soft goods seal or glass-to-metal seal failure that compromises its 
electrical isolation function 
 
5.1.4.1 Requirements – Internal Short Circuit 
 
a. Cells used in COTS batteries or cells selected for a custom battery shall be 
evaluated to ascertain the severity of an internal short circuit event. 
Evaluation criteria of the short circuit event can include, but are not limited to, 
maximum cell temperature achieved, time to maximum temperature and duration 
of event, products vented/ejected from the cell, measurement and/or video of 
flames/hot gases exiting the cell, etc. 
Internal short circuits can be initiated and triggered within a cell by various 
thermal and mechanical methods.  The mechanical methods involve crushing, 
penetrating, and/or shocking forces applied to the cell.  Thermal methods involve 
heat exposure to damage the separator that insulates the anode and cathode.  
More advanced methods involve implanting defects into a cell either during 
manufacture or afterwards and triggering the short by mechanical or thermal 
means.  
b. Measures shall be taken to reduce the likelihood and/or severity of an internal 
short circuit event to a level acceptable to the program/project. 
Best practices listed below are intended to minimize the likelihood of a cell internal short 
event occurring.  Section 5.1.5 discusses steps to be taken when trying to minimize the 
consequence/severity of an internal short circuit event in a custom battery design.   
 
1. Design mitigation measures 
a. In the case of a custom battery design, only cell designs whose 
performance and safety have been sufficiently characterized to support 
safety assessment and validation of the abuse tolerance and where 
insight into the manufacturing control process is provided should be 
approved.   
b. In the case of COTS battery designs, only batteries whose 
performance and safety have been sufficiently characterized to support 
safety assessment and validation of the abuse tolerance should be 
approved. 
c. Batteries should be designed to perform well within the manufacturer’s 
specifications for the cells used to build the battery.   
d. If a particular cell/battery is to be used in an application or environment 
that is beyond the manufacturer’s specification, extensive testing with 
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margin to predicted environments should be carried out to confirm that 
the battery design will not be driven into a catastrophic safety hazard.   
e. Battery designs should also have the required fault tolerance in place 
to prevent the cells from being subjected to off-nominal conditions that 
result in the formation of internal shorts.   
f. Cells or batteries used in space applications should not have any 
records of Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) recalls. 
2. Manufacturing mitigation measures 
a. For custom battery designs, cells should be selected from cell 
manufacturers with a mature production history.   
b. Cell lots should be defined for each battery system as all cells with a 
common date code made from the same continuous production run.   
c. In the case of a custom cell or custom battery design, a cell production 
line audit of the cell design should be conducted to evaluate how well 
contamination, humidity control, and cell defects are limited in all 
phases of cell production processes. High particle counts and poor 
contamination and humidity control are known to contribute to the high 
occurrence of cell failures.  
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3. Test mitigation measures 
a. For custom battery designs, rigorous 100-percent cell acceptance 
testing should be carried out, including charge retention (soft shorts), 
performance uniformity. Poor OCV stability, poor coulombic efficiency 
(discharge ampere-hour (Ah) out/charge Ah in), internal resistance 
fluctuations, and high self-discharge (poor voltage retention) are 
indicators of internal cell defects that could result in an internal short 
circuit.  As an additional measure, the cells can be X-rayed for jelly roll 
or stack misalignment and other defects that could cause internal 
shorts. Credit can be taken for X-rays carried out at the manufacturing 
facility. 
b. For custom-designed and COTS  batteries, early in the cell design 
selection process random sample cells should be examined by DPA 
and nondestructive evaluation (NDE) techniques (CT scans or high-
resolution X-rays) to look for defects that could develop into latent 
internal short circuits.  Since production quality is known to vary from 
lot to lot, this DPA and NDE sample testing should be required for all 
flight lots.  
c. All anomalous observations in a DPA should be chemically analyzed 
and discussed with the cell manufacturer to determine whether they 
will lead to a catastrophic latent defect through the life of the cell. 
d. For lithium-ion and primary lithium systems, the vibration test levels 
should be significantly higher than those typically imposed for 
acceptance tests intended to detect workmanship defects (Appendix 
A).  As a consequence, qualification acceptance vibration testing, 
which is done at levels at least two times than that used for 
acceptance, may be necessary to demonstrate that the higher 
acceptance levels will not adversely impact performance (see 
Appendix A). 
4. Operation 
a. The battery system should be operated in a way that preserves 
measurably positive margins in operating voltage, current, 
temperature, and cycle life versus the manufacturer’s limits for the cell 
design.   
b. If the cell/battery is to be used in environments or applications that are 
beyond the manufacturer’s specification, relevant testing should be 
carried out to qualify the battery design to confirm that no failures will 
develop due to this type of usage during the life of the battery.  In 
addition, samples from each new lot should be tested to confirm that 
this tolerance and safe performance capability exists on subsequent 
productions. 
 
Information on mitigating measures for the lithium-based chemistries is provided in the 
relevant sections in Section 6. 
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5.1.5 Sources – Thermal Runaway Propagation 
 
1. Thermal runaway can be induced by: 
 Overcharge (see Section 5.1.2) 
 Short circuit (see Section 5.1.3) 
 Internal cell short circuit (see Section 5.1.4) 
 Excessively high temperature (see Section 5.4) 
 
5.1.5.1 Requirements – Thermal Runaway Propagation 
 
a. For battery designs greater than a 80-Wh energy employing high specific energy 
cells (greater than 80 watt-hours/kg, for example, lithium-ion chemistries) with 
catastrophic failure modes, the battery shall be evaluated to ascertain the 
severity of a worst-case single-cell thermal runaway event and the propensity of 
the design to demonstrate cell-to-cell propagation in the intended application and 
environment. 
Worst-case thermal runaway events will include method and location of thermal 
runaway initiation and environmental conditions. Thermal analysis that considers 
ohmic and entropic heating should be performed and validated by test. 
NASA has traditionally addressed the threat of thermal runaway incidents in its 
battery deployments through comprehensive prevention protocols.  This 
prevention-centered approach has included extensive screening for 
manufacturing defects, as well as robust battery management controls that 
prevent abuse-induced runaway even in the face of multiple system failures.  
This focused strategy has made the likelihood of occurrence of such an event 
highly improbable.  
This requirement focuses not on the likelihood of such an event but rather on 
understanding the severity of consequences in the intended application should 
this unlikely event occur.   Understanding the consequences of an event allows 
an informed risk assessment and identifies potential mitigation via design or 
operations.  
b. The evaluation shall include all necessary analysis and test to quantify the 
severity (consequence) of the event in the intended application and environment 
as well as to identify design modifications to the battery or the system that could 
appreciably reduce that severity. 
In addition to prevention protocols, programs developing battery designs with 
catastrophic failure modes should take the steps necessary to assess the 
severity of a possible thermal runaway event.  Programs should assess whether 
there are reasonable design changes that could appreciably affect the severity of 
the outcome. 
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Evaluation should include environmental effects to surrounding hardware (i.e., 
temperature, pressure, shock), contamination effects due to any expelled 
contaminants, and venting propulsive effects when venting overboard. 
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5.2 Chemical Exposure Hazards 
 
Battery cells may contain and/or generate toxic and/or corrosive gases.  Release of 
these chemicals and gases into the enclosed environment of a space vehicle would 
contaminate the air supply and exposed surfaces, creating health hazards for 
personnel, operational problems for surrounding hardware, and potential structural 
problems for surrounding facilities.  Release of these chemicals and gases external to a 
space vehicle also may contaminate a space suit and create a resulting human 
exposure hazard upon return to a habitable volume.  
 
Electrolyte leakage occurs during the unintended venting of electrolyte liquid and gases.   
 
a. An assessment shall be made by a toxicologist on the level of toxicity associated 
with the vented products of the battery.   
JSC toxicology assesses the vented products according to JSC 26895, 
Guidelines for Assessing the Toxic Hazard of Spacecraft Chemicals and Test 
Materials.  If the cell electrolyte is rated at toxicity hazard level 2 or higher, the 
leakage is considered catastrophic due to the potential for moderate to severe 
irritation, permanent eye damage, and/or appreciable systemic effects.  Many 
common electrolytes are toxicity hazard level 2. 
 
5.2.1 Chemical Exposure Sources – Mechanical Failure 
 
1. Rupture or structural failure of cell case during launch or use, permitting 
uncontrolled release of electrolyte and gases into the battery enclosure or 
beyond.  
2. Breakage or other failure of sealing provisions, permitting uncontrolled release of 
electrolyte and gases to the battery environment. 
3. Breakage of mounting provisions, including bolts, permitting unconstrained 
movement of the battery. 
4. Fracture of internal current-carrying components, providing a source for arcing 
and explosion. 
5. Generation and release of toxic and/or corrosive gases and liquids via venting. 
 
5.2.1.1 Requirements - Mechanical Failure 
 
a. Battery assembly shall maintain function and be safe after exposure to required 
vibration environments (e.g., SSP 41172, SSP 52005). 
b. Battery assembly shall maintain function and be safe after exposure to required 
shock environments.  
c. Battery assembly shall maintain function and be safe after exposure to required 
atmospheric/vacuum environments. 
d. Cell and battery enclosure materials shall be compatible and ensure that the 
material strength and function are maintained after exposure to electrolyte liquids 
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and gases/vapors, painted coatings, potting materials and their solvents, 
cleaning solutions, and cell case sealing materials and their solvents. 
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5.2.2 Sources – Seals and Vents 
 
1. Faulty seals in cells. 
2. Inadequate design of mechanism to trap electrolyte within the cell, such as a vent 
tube extension or Teflon frit in the vent tube, as pertains to cell designs with a 
relief valve. 
3. Forced electrolyte leakage due to cell overheating under electrical, mechanical, 
and/or thermal abuse conditions. 
4. Exposure to high temperatures may damage or degrade the internal components 
of the battery, the battery container, or other equipment in close proximity to the 
battery. 
 
5.2.2.1 Requirements – Seals and Vents 
 
a. A welded seal construction without softgood seals shall be used for all Li-SO2 
and oxyhalide battery chemistries and be provided with a rupture disk or 
equivalent pressure-relief mechanism to provide for a leak-before-burst design.  
An equivalent pressure relief mechanism can be a glass-to-metal seal that cracks 
to relieve pressure prior to header bursting.   
Secondary enclosures should be considered in the design.   
b. Cells with highly toxic or lethal electrolytes (greater than toxicology category 2), 
such as those in Li-BCX, Li-SOCl2, Li-SO2Cl2, and Li-SO2, shall not be used in or 
vented into habitable volumes. 
If used external to habitable volumes, operational safety controls should be 
implemented to protect personnel during pre- and post-mission processing. 
c. Cell seals shall be 100-percent leaked tested at flight cell and/or flight battery 
level. 
d. Cell seal design shall have positive margins over cell vent pressures, as 
specified in 5.1.1.1e-g. 
e. Cells with welded seals shall follow the requirement stated in AWS 
C7.4/C7.4M:2008. 
f. Electrolyte absorbent material, containment, and/or a tortuous path for the exit of 
liquid electrolyte from the battery enclosure shall be used in the design.  
g. All internal surfaces of a metal battery enclosure shall be anodized and/or coated 
with a non-electrically conductive electrolyte-resistant paint to prevent a 
subsequent short circuit hazard as a result of electrolyte leakage.   
A nonmetallic battery case should be made of an electrolyte compatible material. 
h. Vent holes in the battery enclosure, if present, shall be covered with a gas 
permeable/liquid impermeable or electrolyte absorbent, nonflammable material to 
trap released liquid electrolyte.   
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i. The seals of cell and battery designs shall be verified to work at worst-case 
mission operating conditions. 
Determination of worst-case condition should consider any two credible failures, 
such as loss of external cooling or an unanticipated load up to the limit of 
designed circuit protections, which may lead to off-nominal thermal conditions, to 
ensure the battery design has adequate thermal management to keep cell and 
battery seals within their operating pressure and temperature limits. 
j. Cells with welded seal construction may also be enclosed in sealed containers.  
If the sealed container is used as a control for fault tolerance to a catastrophic 
hazard, it shall be verified with test.   
k. If a container with a welded seal construction is used to contain toxic gas from 
being released into a habitable volume, then the sealed container shall be 
compliant with NASA-STD-5019 or an equivalent standard. 
 
5.3 Electrical Hazards 
 
Specific electrical hazards associated with batteries include electrical shock, arc-flash, 
and loss of power to critical safety systems.  
 
5.3.1 Sources of Electrical Shock, Corona, and Arc-Flash 
 
1. Personnel exposure to battery power terminals and/or sensor terminals. 
2. Failure of battery case, exposing high voltages. 
3. Failure of internal wiring, exposing high voltages to the case. 
4. Bridging of battery terminals, resulting in an arc-flash. 
5. Bridging of high voltage battery terminals with sharp edges, in a vacuum 
environment, resulting in a corona event. 
 
5.3.1.1 Requirements 
 
a. Batteries shall protect against electrical shock as specified in NASA-STD-3001. 
b. Batteries exceeding 100 Vdc shall be assessed for arc-flash hazards. 
c. In battery designs where analysis shows an arc-flash risk, arc flash and shock 
personal protective equipment shall be employed when working in or around the 
battery. 
d. External shorts shall be controlled as documented in Section 5.1.3. 
e. Corona mitigation designs shall be incorporated as stated in JSC 29129 for high-
voltage batteries used in a vacuum environment. 
 
5.3.2 Sources of Loss of Power 
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1. Short circuit or overload leading to a designed interruption of power (fuse, etc.). 
2. Over-discharge of the battery beyond usable voltage levels caused by use 
beyond intended design, low temperatures that reduce battery capacity, failure 
controls that degrade performance, etc. 
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5.3.2.1 Requirements 
 
a. Batteries employed as the sole source of energy for critical safety systems shall 
be assessed for loss-of-power hazard. 
Incorporation of design features intended to constrain battery operation in order 
to optimize battery health, should consider if the equipment the battery is 
powering is deemed more critical than the battery health. The assessment should 
be used to determine the appropriate level and number of features whose failure 
could cause loss of electrical power.  If an off-nominal operation of the battery will 
be required for contingency, battery safety should be assessed prior to further 
use.  Battery health refers to factors that reduce its performance or life. 
 
5.4 Extreme Temperature Hazards 
 
Extreme battery temperatures can be hazards for the crew and ground personnel (touch 
temperatures) and can be a failure source for chemical exposure and fire/explosion 
hazards.  
 
From a battery perspective, high temperature occurs when the operating temperature of 
a battery or cell exceeds the upper temperature limit of the manufacturer's performance 
specifications, leading to hazards found in other sections, such as chemical exposure, 
explosion, fire, and loss of power.  
 
5.4.1 Sources 
 
1. External heating from the environment and/or surrounding equipment.  
2. Sustained short circuit/high discharge rates. 
3. Sustained high charge rates. 
4. Cell failure leading to thermal runaway and possible propagation to other cells in 
the battery. 
5. Failure of battery heaters leading to uncontrolled high or low temperatures.   
6. Failure of an active cooling system. 
7. Charging lithium-ion type batteries at very low temperatures causing lithium 
metal deposition that could subsequently lead to failures, including high 
temperatures, venting, and fire. 
8. Imbalanced internal resistances caused by temperature variations within a 
battery leading to large imbalances and thermal gradients. 
 
5.4.2 Requirements 
 
a. Battery thermal extremes shall be controlled during all mission phases to ensure 
that the crew is protected from extreme touch temperatures.  
The maximum allowable continuous touch temperature for surfaces in crewed 
spacecraft is 44 degrees Centigrade (°C) (112°F).  Warning labels should be 
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employed for surface temperatures between 45 and 50°C (113 and 122°F), and 
should have protective measures above 50°C (122°F).  The minimum touch 
temperature for surfaces in crewed spacecraft is 10°C (50°F).  The requirements 
and guidelines in NASA-STD-3001 should be consulted and followed.  
If the battery or cell will not be directly touched but is located near a surface that 
will be touched, temperature controls should be incorporated to prevent 
excessive battery or cell heat from transferring to the touchable surface. 
b. Battery thermal extremes shall be controlled and verified via test at worst-case 
mission environments to ensure that all cell temperatures remain within safe 
operating ranges specified by the manufacturer or verified by tests. 
Excessive battery and/or cell temperatures can lead to battery and/or cell 
leakage, venting, or fire/explosion.  
Thermal protective devices should be incorporated to protect batteries from going 
into a venting, fire, or thermal runaway condition.  Some examples include: 1) 
thermally actuated circuit breakers or thermostats set to interrupt the load current 
before the cell and/or battery temperature reaches a hazardous temperature, 2) 
heat sinks, 3) heat shunts, or 4) active cooling loops in the battery to remove 
internally generated heat from the cells and/or battery.  
Batteries should be installed such that they are isolated from potential external 
heat sources by thermal optimization of the on-board location of the battery to 
provide protection from convective, radiative, or conductive heat sources. 
Thermal analysis should be carried out to determine design characteristics that 
will minimize thermal gradients within a battery design.  
Heat sinks and heat dissipation and other thermal design features should be 
used to minimize sensible heating of the battery during operation as well as to 
minimize thermal gradients within the battery design to the degree necessary to 
meet mission requirements. 
c. External short circuits shall be controlled for the cells and battery assembly, as 
discussed in Section 5.1.3, to prevent heat generation resulting from high rates of 
discharge. 
d. Validated thermal analysis and testing shall be performed to confirm that the 
battery cells will not be exposed to temperatures below the manufacturer’s rating 
or the limit established by qualification tests.   
Heaters or equivalent devices and methods should be used if charging is 
required in thermal environments that are below the safe charging temperature of 
the battery. 
e. Thermal extremes due to thermal runaway propagation shall be addressed as 
discussed in Section 5.1.5.  
f. Battery heaters shall be designed with appropriate levels of failure tolerance to 
prevent excessive heating of the battery and/or cells. 
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Where practical, the heater should be designed such that maximum heat input at 
maximum environmental temperature would not result in any one cell exceeding 
the specified maximum operating temperature.  When this is not possible, 
redundant high-temperature cutoff thermostats should be used.  Hardware 
controls are preferred over software/firmware controls.  
The effects of differential thermal expansion and contraction between dissimilar 
materials, such as plastic cell cases and metal battery cases, should be 
incorporated in the verification of the battery design if the battery will experience 
significantly low or high temperatures from external or internal sources.  For 
example, plastic cell cases should not be "pinned" to a metal battery case by 
cement, hard potting, or mechanical means.  Resilient filler material may be 
required inside the battery case to absorb dimensional changes resulting from 
thermal expansion/contraction changes.  In prismatic cell designs, the battery 
case structure should be designed to withstand or negate the stresses induced 
by cell swelling.  The direction of cell swelling during discharge varies for cell 
shapes and chemistries.  Most prismatic cells swell in the direction normal to the 
plane of their electrodes (flat face of cells). 
  
JSC-20793 Rev D 
53 
See cover for full disclosure. Verify correct revision before use at 
https://qmsmasterlist.jsc.nasa.gov/Home.aspx/Organization/31. 
6. SAFETY RELEVANT TO SPECIFIC BATTERY CHEMISTRIES 
 
Battery users frequently request a listing of batteries "approved" for use onboard 
crewed space vehicles.  Since the safe use of a battery is partially application specific, 
there can be no such list.  Any battery that can be made safe to fly in the crewed space 
vehicle environment can be used; however, there are some batteries that are not 
practical to make safe.  For example, lithium-sulfur dioxide cells have built-in 
overpressure vents that will release SO2 (sulfur dioxide) gas and other electrolyte 
components that are highly toxic; thus, these are unacceptable in the habitable area of 
a space vehicle.  However, that chemistry has been used safely in the non-pressurized 
areas of crewed spacecraft.  Note that the thrust possible from a cell/battery venting 
incident should be addressed for possible impacts to vehicle mission.  When at all 
possible, it is better to build a battery using a cell chemistry and cell design that is 
inherently safe on its own for space vehicle use rather than applying extensive (and 
often costly) modifications to make an inherently unsuitable cell acceptable for crewed 
flight use. 
 
Batteries can be categorized into three main types: primary, secondary, and reserve.  
The primary batteries are typically one-time usage types and are not capable of being 
charged after they are depleted.  The secondary batteries are those that can be 
recharged.  The reserve batteries are those in which the active materials are mixed just 
before use. 
 
The following is a historical list of cell chemistries, both primary (nonrechargeable) and 
secondary (rechargeable), which have been flown on crewed space vehicles.   
 
 Alkaline-manganese primary  
 LeClanche (carbon-zinc) primary  
 Lead-acid secondary cells having immobilized electrolyte 
 Lithium/lithium-ion polymer secondary (including lithium-polymer variation) 
 Lithium metal anode primary cells having the following cathodic (positive) active 
materials: 
o Poly-carbon monofluoride 
o Iodine 
o Manganese dioxide 
o Silver chromate  
o Sulfur dioxide (external to habitable spaces only) 
o Thionyl chloride 
o Thionyl chloride with bromine chloride complex additive (Li-BCX) 
o Iron disulfide 
 Lithium sulfur 
 Mercuric oxide-zinc primary 
 Nickel-cadmium secondary   
 Nickel-hydrogen secondary 
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 Nickel-metal hydride secondary 
 Silver-zinc primary and secondary 
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 Zinc-air primary 
 Sodium-sulfur secondary (external to habitable space) 
 Thermal batteries 
 
There are additional battery chemistries that are emerging in commercial/industrial 
prominence.  Use of these chemistries should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis for 
use in crewed flight. 
 
Often the cells used in batteries for crewed space vehicle are commercially available.  A 
special "government" purchase is not required for alkaline, zinc-air, and lithium coin 
cells; however, minimal screening tests are required of sample commercial cells to 
ensure the cells will perform in the required load and environment without leakage or 
failure.  Specific certification tests may also be required of a battery depending on its 
application and design.  Often a certificate of compliance regarding manufacturing 
processes and shelf life data is required by Safety and Mission Assurance personnel 
responsible for certifying the hardware, so designers are cautioned to inquire ahead of 
time regarding necessary documentation. 
 
To ensure that cells are fresh for flight use, shelf-life limits from the date the cells are 
manufactured have been established for the various chemistries.   See Appendix C for 
more details on shelf and service life.  Battery providers need to keep in mind that 
stowage of a cell with a bypass diode across the cell/battery terminals can cause a slow 
drain of capacity of the cell, thus lowering the service life.   
 
Rechargeable cells typically are stowed late to retain a good charge on the cells for 
flight use.  Rechargeable cells generally have a faster self-discharge rate than primary 
cells, so some launch delays could force a hardware exchange with freshly charged 
cells or a recharge on the launch pad (with prior approval).  In cases where large nickel-
hydrogen batteries will require charging in a space vehicle on the launch pad, 
consideration should be given to see that adequate cooling of the battery is available.   
 
6.1  Alkaline Primary Batteries 
 
6.1.1  Definition 
 
Alkaline manganese dioxide cells were introduced in the early 1960’s and have become 
the most dominant battery cell in use today.  They have higher energy density, better 
service and shelf life, and better resistance to leakage than the carbon-zinc cell.  The 
cell is typically of a bobbin (or button) design. 
 
The basic electrochemical processes taking place in these alkaline cells are: 
 
Anode: Zn + 2 OH-   Zn(OH)2 + 2 e-  
Cathode:  2MnO2 + H2O + 2 e-  2MnOOH + 2 OH-  
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The overall reaction is: Zn + 2MnO2 + 2H2O   Zn(OH)2 + 2MnOOH  
The anode is made up of zinc powder and the cathode of manganese dioxide powder.  
The electrolyte is 35 percent KOH.  The nominal voltage of alkaline cells ranges from 
1.5 to 1.6 V, and most of their capacity is consumed when the voltage drops to about 
1.0 V.  Shelf life limits are summarized in Appendix C. 
 
6.1.2  Hazard Sources 
 
As with any aqueous electrolyte, the cell can generate flammable mixtures of hydrogen 
and oxygen.  The KOH electrolyte is extremely caustic and can cause damage to eyes, 
skin, and mucous membranes, as well as corrosion of metals.  In short circuit 
conditions, these cells can exceed touch temperature limits and swell to the point that 
removal from cylindrical constraints becomes difficult.  Silver oxide cells utilize the same 
KOH electrolyte and are considered within this section. 
 
6.1.3  Controls/Process Guidelines 
 
a. The battery boxes used for alkaline cells should be vented and have a 
nonconductive coating and absorbent material.   
b. Non Critical alkaline battery designs are documented on a Unique Hazard 
Report. 
c. The unique hazard report should include cell product information, Underwriters 
Laboratory (UL) or international standard safety test data, and a circuit schematic 
showing the safety circuitry (e.g., fuses, diodes, etc.).  In the absence of 
verification data and/or safety circuitry, testing should be performed to provide 
this safety data.   
d. For cells and batteries listed in the Non Critical category, flight acceptance 
testing should include functional tests OCV, CCV, mass, internal resistance, and 
visual inspection. 
e. For batteries that do not fall within the Non Critical category, a complete 
engineering, qualification, and flight acceptance test program should be 
completed and a Unique Hazard Report should be submitted.  
f. Alkaline cells should not be left in devices that are not operated for more than 1 
year.  If devices will not be used for more than 1 year, the alkaline cells should be 
removed and discarded after each use. 
g. Alkaline cells that are partially used should not be stored and reused.  Tracking 
of performance for each cell is cost and time prohibitive; hence, they should be 
discarded in dry trash after each use.  
 
6.2 Alkaline Secondary Batteries 
 
6.2.1  Definition 
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In the early 1990’s, "rechargeable" alkaline cells entered the commercial cell market.  
Historically, alkaline cells have been used solely as primary, nonrechargeable cells.  
Alkaline cells being advertised as rechargeable are sold with a special charger that 
should be used, following strict instructions, in order to achieve rechargeability.  
However, since their performance and capacity is significantly less than alternative 
primaries, a comparison with a nickel-metal hydride battery design is advised before this 
option.   
 
6.2.2  Hazard Sources 
 
Due to the hazards associated with charging cells and the strict routine that should be 
followed for processing these cells through charge/discharge cycles, flight hardware 
using "rechargeable" alkaline cells should be on a case-by-case basis.  Since the 
commercial chargers typically lack the type of fail-safe controls required for use of the 
hardware in the space vehicle environment, the use of the commercial chargers should 
be restricted.  A thorough evaluation of the charger design is required to identify the 
hazard controls inherent in the design, if any, and the missing hazard controls.  The 
applicable hazards detailed in subsections of Section 4.0 should be accounted for in the 
design, especially controls concerning the hazards associated with gas generation, high 
temperature, and charging. 
 
6.2.3  Controls/Process Guidelines 
 
The controls from Section 5 are applicable here.  In addition, the applicable controls 
detailed in subsections of Section 5 should be accounted for in the design, especially 
controls concerning the hazards associated with charging. 
 
6.3 Lead-Acid Batteries 
 
6.3.1  Definition 
 
The practical lead-acid battery traces its origins to 1860 and is one of the few batteries 
with acid electrolyte (battery acid).  Since this battery generates hydrogen during charge 
and discharge and on open circuit, the Vent Regulated Lead Acid (VRLA) battery is not 
to be flown without a waiver.  The Sealed Lead Acid (SLA) battery cell is designed to 
contain any hydrogen generated within the cell case.   
 
The half-reactions in a lead-acid battery are the following: 
 
Anode: Pb     Pb2+ + 2e- 
  Pb2+ + SO42-   PbSO4   
 
Cathode:  PbO2 + 4H+ + 2e-   Pb2+ + 2H2O 
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  Pb2+ + SO42-    PbSO4   
The overall reaction is: Pb + PbO2 + H2SO4   2PbSO4 + 2H2O  
The anode in lead acid cells is made up of a sponge-like metallic lead, and the cathode 
is lead dioxide (PbO2) in both α and β forms.  The α form contributes to a higher cycle 
life, although it is slightly less electrochemically active and lower in gravimetric energy 
density.  The electrolyte is sulfuric acid of about 37 percent by weight (approximately 
2M H2SO4) and a specific gravity of 1.26 to 1.28 when fully charged. 
 
The operating voltage of the cell is typically 2.0 to 1.75 V; however, the cell can be 
discharged down to 1.0 V.  Lead-acid cells are charged using a constant voltage 
protocol to 2.39 V, and because most of these are used as uninterruptible power 
sources, they should be kept fully charged at a float voltage between 2.17 to 2.25 V, 
with this voltage being dependent on the nature of the anode and the specific gravity of 
the electrolyte.  A shelf life of 7 years can be obtained if the cells are maintained at a 
float voltage when not in use. 
 
6.3.2  Hazard Sources 
 
a. The traditional concerns with lead-acid batteries are hydrogen generation and 
loss of electrolyte containment.   
b. This cell chemistry is capable of extremely high current rates, which could result 
in burns to the crew or overheating of improperly protected electronic 
components. 
 
6.3.3  Controls/Process Guidelines 
 
a. Appropriate absorbent materials should be used to contain any electrolyte vented 
from the cells.   
b. Fusing components should be used to limit the maximum discharge capability of 
the battery.   
c. All batteries should be two-fault tolerant to overcharge and external short 
hazards (see Sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, respectively) and a Unique Hazard 
Report should be completed. 
d. All batteries should undergo engineering, qualification, and flight acceptance 
testing.  
e. Sample lot testing should be performed on 3 to 6 percent of every new lot of cells 
and batteries procured for the same application.   
 
6.4 Lithium-ion Secondary Batteries 
 
6.4.1 Definition 
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Lithium-ion batteries are rechargeable batteries and have a high voltage cathode such 
as LiMO2 (M = Co, Ni, Mn, Al, or combinations of these) or LiFePO4 (and derivatives of 
this olivine material).  The anode is usually a form of carbon or LiTi4O5 or lithium alloys 
of Si or Sn.  The electrolyte in these cells is made up of a combination of organic 
carbonates and a salt.  The most commonly used salt is LiPF6 (lithium 
hexafluorophosphate).  Other salts such as LiBOB (lithium bisoxalato borate) or LiBF4 
(lithium tetrafluoroborate) have also been used.  The charge and discharge in the 
lithium-ion cells occurs by the process of intercalation and deintercalation, respectively, 
as shown in the equations on the following page. 
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Positive LiMO2     Li1-xMO2 + xLi+ + xe 
Negative C + xLi+ + xe    LixC 
Overall LiMO2 + C     LixC + Li1-xMO2 
 
The nominal voltage of lithium-ion cells is about 3.6 V, and the highest energy density 
obtained from a state-of-the-art cell is currently greater than 230 Wh/kg.  The typical 
charging protocol for the lithium-ion cells includes a constant current charge to a voltage 
of 4.1 V or 4.2 V (depending on the metal oxide cathode and manufacturer’s 
recommendations) and a hold at constant voltage until the current falls down to 
approximately C/100 (this can vary according to the manufacturer).  Due to the unique 
charging characteristic of the lithium-ion cells and batteries, charging should be 
performed with a dedicated charger only.  This charger may be a “smart” charger in 
some cases.  If a dedicated charger does not exist, the equipment used for charging 
should have adequate controls so as to not impose an overcharge, overcurrent, or 
overvoltage condition on the battery.  The discharge of the cell depends on the load 
used, but the end voltage during discharge should not go below manufacturer’s 
specified voltage.  Typical end of discharge voltages for the batteries in different 
equipment has been 3.0 V/cell.  Internal resistance for the lithium-ion cells varies from 
80 to 120 mΩ for low-capacity (1 to 3 Ah) cells to about 0.8 mΩ for high-capacity (190-
Ah) cells. 
 
Lithium-ion cells typically are spiral wound or prismatic.  Under the prismatic types there 
are true prismatic, which are stacked flat plates, and others that are folded over to give 
a prismatic appearance.  A third variety that is increasingly common in the market today 
is the elliptic cylindrical type, where the spiral wound stack is flattened to give a 
prismatic appearance.  Typically, the commercial cells used in cellular phones are 
prismatic cells, while those used in camcorders, cameras, and PCs are spiral wound 
cylindrical cells.  Lithium-ion cells have  
100-percent energy efficiency through most of their cycle life (input energy is equal to 
output energy).  While commercial cylindrical cells are either case negative or case 
positive, most of the prismatic cells above 5-Ah capacity are either case neutral or case 
positive. 
 
Commercial cylindrical cells (e.g., 18650, 26650, etc.) can have three levels of 
protection.  These are the PTC current limiters, current interrupt device (CID), and the 
shutdown separator.  The PTC device is activated in the case of external 
short/overcurrent and over-temperature conditions.  The CID is activated when the cells 
build up excessive pressure that usually occurs when the cells are overcharged to 
voltages close to or above 5 V.  The shutdown separator is activated when the cells 
reach a certain temperature that causes a meltdown of the middle polyethylene layer of 
charge
discharge
charge
discharge
charge
discharge
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the three-layer separator.  This usually occurs at about 130ºC (266ºF).  Not all lithium-
ion cells have a shutdown separator.  Commercial cell designs today have a ceramic-
coated separator that is expected to be more robust to shorting events.  The cells also 
have a vent that is rated to vent above 150 psi.  However, in most of the cell designs 
under discussion here, the shutdown separator and vent activate near or above the 
onset of thermal runaway temperatures and are not typically considered to be safety 
controls.  Furthermore, venting of flammable gases will result in flames, sparks, and fire 
in the presence of an oxygen atmosphere, which in a majority of cases may evolve from 
cathode decomposition inside the cell. 
 
High-capacity cells consist of the shutdown separator, vents, and a fusible link to the 
electrode as possible levels of protection.  The shutdown separator is activated when 
the cells reach temperatures close to 130ºC (266ºF).  The fusible link melts at specific 
current levels, which then inhibits any hazardous occurrences during an external short 
condition.  The vent typically operates above 150 psi, and cells typically do not perform 
after a vent.  These safety features are not always effective at mitigating a safety 
incident. 
 
The SOC and temperature at which the cells are stored or cycled greatly affects the 
irreversible capacity loss in the cells.  For example, one commercial cell in a period of 
storage for 1 year exhibited less than a 2-percent loss at 0-percent SOC and 0ºC, 
whereas it exhibited about  
13-percent loss at 100-percent SOC and 40ºC.  The temperature and the DoD to which 
the cells are cycled also affect the deliverable capacity of the cells with cycle life. 
 
6.4.2 Hazard Sources 
 
The main abuse conditions that cause hazards in lithium-ion cells are the result of 
overcharge, internal and external shorts, and high temperatures.  Although over-
discharge is in itself not a hazard, it can cause development of high resistance and cell 
conditions that can subsequently lead to a hazard.   
 
Studies have shown that overcharge conditions can lead to the deposition of lithium 
metal that can create internal shorts in the cell.  The electrolyte in the lithium-ion cells 
contains flammable organic solvents, and under high voltage conditions they 
decompose, leading to the formation of gases (e.g., carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, 
and other gaseous decomposition products).  This can cause overpressure conditions 
inside the cell, leading to smoke and flame if the gases are not vented benignly.  Rapid 
charging at temperatures below the manufacturer’s specification can also cause 
deposition of lithium dendrites.  However, lithium dendrite formation can be mitigated if 
the charge current is lowered per the manufacturer’s specification or is limited to less 
than full SOC. 
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External short of lithium-ion cells of the high and low impedance types can also result in 
high temperatures and pressures inside the cell, resulting in venting, fire, thermal 
runaway, and/or explosions. 
 
The lithium-ion cells under simulated internal short conditions have shown to exhibit 
venting, fire, and smoke, as well as thermal runaway.  Simulated internal short tests can 
determine the tolerance of particular cell designs to internal shorts.  However, most 
lithium-ion cell designs have been shown to be intolerant to internal shorts, especially at 
high SOCs.   
 
Internal shorts can occur in two ways.  One is due to poor quality control in the cell 
manufacturing process that causes impurities and contaminants to be present as latent 
defects inside the cell that can later pierce the separator, causing an internal short 
circuit that can result in electrolyte leakage, fire, and thermal runaway.  This cause is 
mitigated by the DFMR approach specified herein.  The second cause for this event 
results from abuse such as overcharge and over-discharge or extreme temperatures.  
Internal shorts can occur when cells are used beyond their specifications, such as 
charge and discharge rates beyond the cell’s capability, exceeding end-of-charge or 
end-of discharge voltages, and exceeding operational temperature ranges.  Such 
excesses can cause the deposition of metallic dendrites of copper and lithium.  
Localized intense heat due to impurities or dendrite formation provides the environment 
for a fire in the presence of a flammable organic electrolyte.  Aluminum metal current 
collector contributes to the thermal runaway of a cell when internal temperatures reach 
the melting temperature of aluminum (~660°C).   This second cause is to be controlled 
by a failure tolerance approach.   
 
Over-discharge conditions lead to the electrodeposition of copper on the anode, 
cathode, and separator, causing the formation of a short circuit condition.  Gas 
formation due to decomposition of electrolyte under/over-discharge conditions have also 
been reported in the literature [32, 33].  In most cases, over-discharge, even into 
reversal, is benign and results in a shorted (dead) cell.   However, subsequent charges 
of multi-cell modules with one or more cells that experience over-discharge can cause 
other cells to go into an overcharge condition.  The tolerance of a cell to over-discharge 
conditions (voltage, etc.) should be characterized for battery designs before safety 
controls are set. 
 
Lithium-ion cells under very high temperature conditions [above 150C (302F)] can 
vent, smoke, and exhibit thermal runaway accompanied by fire and/or an expulsion of 
can contents through the vent holes in the cell or through the bursting of the cell header. 
 
6.4.3 Controls/Process Guidelines 
 
a. As with all rechargeable crewed spacecraft batteries, lithium-ion secondary 
batteries should include design features and operational protocols to provide 
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failure tolerance to misuse and off-nominal operating conditions beyond cell 
manufacturer’s and/or verified voltage, current, temperature, and life limits.  
b. Engineering and qualification testing of lithium-ion batteries and cells, lot 
certification, acceptance testing, and screening of flight batteries should be 
performed on all batteries that do not fall under the noncritical category.   
 
6.4.3.1  Engineering Evaluation, Development, and Design 
 
COTS Applications 
 
a. In the case of COTS lithium-ion batteries, features that should be characterized 
for the battery include the fuse rating; the operational characteristics (voltage) of 
the overcharge, overcurrent, and over-discharge protection switches; and the 
details of operation of the protective circuitry.   
b. For lithium-ion batteries of the Critical Category, test data should be provided to 
show at least single-fault tolerance.  The second level of control should be 
supported with existing test data or manufacturer data.   
c. Critical batteries should be built from cells from a single lot, and the battery safety 
circuitry should be provided for review with the Unique Hazard Report.    
d. For all lithium-ion button cells, the cell specification, UL safety test data, and the 
safety circuitry should be provided in the Unique Hazard Report. 
 
Custom Designs 
 
a. The lithium-ion batteries should undergo performance and abuse tests at the cell 
and battery level as part of the engineering evaluation test program.   
1. The performance tests should include, as a minimum, physical 
characterization (i.e., dimensions and weight), electrochemical 
characterization (i.e., OCV, closed circuit voltage (CCV), internal 
resistance/impedance, capacity checks), mission profile performance, and 
vacuum leak checks.   
2. The abuse tests should consist of, as a minimum, overcharge, over-
discharge, external short (i.e., low and smart impedance (an impedance 
necessary to draw current just below the current limiter designed limit)), 
internal short/crush, heat-to-vent, vibration, drop, and vent and burst 
pressure determination.   
3. Some of the features that should be characterized for the battery are the 
fuse rating, the operational characteristics (voltage) of the overcharge and 
over-discharge protection switches, and the details of operation of the 
protective circuitry.   
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b. Safety devices incorporated into the cell, if any, should be tested and 
documented (e.g., PTC devices, CIDs, shutdown separator, etc.).   
c. For custom-designed batteries, cell voltage monitoring consistent with 4.4.3 
should be provided. 
d. For custom-designed batteries, battery-level current monitoring consistent with 
4.4.3 should be provided for all phases of a mission from ground testing to return 
and landing. 
e. For large custom-designed batteries in the catastrophic category, thermal 
analyses should be carried out to determine the battery design and configuration 
that would provide the optimum heat dissipation and the least thermal gradient 
over the entire battery (recommended range of <3 °C).  
f. For custom-designed batteries, temperature monitoring consistent with 4.4.3 
should be provided based on high-fidelity thermal analysis to determine the 
optimum number of thermal sensors required to monitor and protect the batteries 
for nominal and off-nominal conditions. 
 
Battery Charging 
 
a. Charging and other ground and flight operations should not impose any hazards 
on the battery pack that is being charged.   
1. Lithium-ion batteries should be charged with a dedicated charger or a 
universal “smart” charger that recognizes the battery chemistry via the use 
of unique electrically erasable programmable read-only memory or 
equivalent method of identification.  In the event that a dedicated charger 
is not used or an alternative charging method is used, adequate controls 
should be in place to prevent any one cell or a battery pack from going 
into an overvoltage, overcurrent, or overcharge condition.   
2. The charger, charging equipment, charge circuitry, or charging protocol 
should be evaluated under normal operating conditions to understand its 
characteristics and verify its safety.    
3. It should be verified that the battery charging equipment (if not the 
dedicated charger) has at least two levels of control that will prevent it 
from causing a hazardous condition on the battery being charged. 
4. The COTS chargers, if used to charge the batteries on-orbit, should be 
from a single lot, and charger circuitry should be provided with the 
standard hazard report for review and approval. 
5. The overcharge controls should be consistent with the dissimilar 
redundancy requirements of Section 4. 
 
6.4.3.2  Qualification Testing 
 
a. For Non-Critical battery designs, a Unique Hazard Report with UL or international 
standard safety test data is sufficient for documentation of the battery. 
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Non-Critical Lithium-ion button cells that cannot be removed from the equipment 
(e.g., cell soldered to circuit board) may be qualified at the end-item level. 
b. The pass/fail criteria for the recheck of the functional baseline should be set 
stringently to determine any failures, including subtle failures due to cell internal 
manufacturing defects. 
For example, COTS battery programs use a less-than-0.5-percent change in 
OCV and mass and a less-than-3-percent capacity change as pass/fail criteria.  
 
6.4.3.3 Acceptance Testing 
 
a. All flight cells and batteries should undergo acceptance testing that includes, as a 
minimum, verification of battery performance to mission requirements by 
charge/discharge cycling, vibration, and vacuum leak checks.   
b. Acceptance testing should include a minimum of 10 charge/discharge cycles to 
screen for latent defects and infant mortalities.  The required number of cycles 
can be achieved using the total of cycles performed at the vendor, during cell 
acceptance screening, at sub-battery assembly, and at the completed assembly 
level.  
c. The vibration levels and spectrum used to screen the qualification and flight 
batteries for the occurrence of internal shorts should be higher than what is 
obtained from the calculation of mission requirements (Appendix A). 
d. In the event that cell-level controls are used as safety controls, irrespective of the 
cell size and design, test data should be provided to prove that these devices are 
effectively working as designed in the flight lot of cells.  
e. For custom battery designs, the flight lot of cells should be 100-percent visually 
inspected (e.g., corrosion, bulging, scratches, dents and deformations, 
misaligned seals, electrolyte leakage, contaminants in the seal, etc.).  
f. For custom battery designs made of small-capacity, high-volume commercial 
cells, the flight lot of cells should be acceptance screened to remove ±3-sigma 
outliers for the following minimum performance parameters: OCV, mass, 
dimensions, DC internal resistance and/or AC impedance, leak check, charge 
and discharge capacity, and charge or voltage retention.  (For large lot sizes of 
cells, dimensional screening can be performed using “go/no-go” jigs or gauges.)  
Cells with temporary discrepancies should be rejected.  EP-WI-031 can be used 
for cell acceptance testing of lots of lithium-ion cells.  To ensure only lots with 
adequate performance uniformity pass, after removing outlier cells, the resultant 
±3*σ  range for the following parameters as a percentage of the mean  
(±3-sigma range/mean) should not exceed the following: 
1. OCV (<1%) 
2. Mass (<2%) 
3. Capacity (<5%) 
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4. DC and AC resistance (<15%)  
If the total number of cells that fail the acceptance screening criteria is greater 
than  
15 percent of the lot, then the lot is rejected. 
The following flow takes advantage of the low cost of high-volume commercial 
cells and assumes a large quantity of cells within the sample set that can be 
screened down to flight set.  In addition, this flow imposes a uniformity 
requirement such that the 6-sigma range (±3-sigma range width) is narrow by 
requiring that it be less than a percentage of the mean.  These strict uniformity 
requirements may not be suitable for large-capacity cell designs, as these are 
often lower volume, and uniformity is often not as tight as on the smaller, high-
volume commercial cells. 
 
Figure 6.4.3-1.  Cell Acceptance Flow with Large Numbers of Smaller, High-Volume  
Commercial Cells 
In this case, subsequent iterations yield a flight lot that is tightly grouped.  As a 
result, the cell matching that follows becomes a formality. 
In the event that large-capacity, lower volume cells are planned for the flight 
build, a different flow may be more suitable, as generally there are fewer cells to 
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work with at the beginning of the screening.  In this case, additional screening 
iterations may not be possible with the limited number of high-cost cells involved.  
In addition, cell matching takes a more prominent role. 
 
 
Reject Lot
No. of cells 
passing is           
> 85%
Cells subjected to 
statistical analysis based 
on OCV, capacity and dc 
resistance: pass is those 
within the +/-3 sigma
NO
Opt to do 
additional rounds 
of statistical 
screening
YES
Cells subjected additional 
rounds of statistical 
analysis based on OCV, 
capacity and dc resistance: 
pass is those within the +/-
3 sigma with all outliers 
removed
YES
cell matching and battery 
assembly using stringent 
cell matching criteria (≤0.1 
% for OCV and mass; ≤ 5% 
for capacity; ≤ 10% for Re)
NO
 
Figure 6.4.3-2.  Cell Acceptance Flow with Small Numbers of Larger, Lower Volume  
Custom Cells 
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g. Within the cells that fall into the ±3-sigma range, the following parameters may 
be used for matching cells: OCV, mass, capacity, DC resistance, and AC 
impedance.   
h. For custom batteries, the “as received” cell OCV measurement is an excellent 
screen for identifying charge retention (soft short) outliers if the time between the 
last time the SOC was set and the measurement is made is over 1 year.  If that 
time delay is not possible, then one method for screening cells with soft shorts is 
to deeply and slowly discharge the cells to 0-percent SOC at the lowest 
operational constant voltage set by the manufacturer and observe the bounce-
back of the OCV over a 14-day period.  Declining OCVs from a maximum over 
the 14-day stand can be indicative of a soft short and pass/fail criteria should be 
set accordingly.  
i. For custom battery designs, 100 percent of the flight batteries should undergo 
acceptance screening that includes visual inspection, OCV, mass, dimensions, 
DC internal resistance, vibration to higher levels (Appendix A), and leak check 
with charge and discharge capacity checks before and after the vibration check.  
The pass/fail criteria should be stringent in order to recognize subtle failures or 
defects and should be based on the results of the qualification test program. 
j. For COTS battery designs, 100 percent of the flight batteries should undergo 
acceptance screening that should remove ±3-sigma outliers in the following 
minimum performance parameters: visual inspection, OCV, mass, dimensions, 
DC internal resistance, leak check, and charge and discharge capacity.  The 
flight acceptance tests should include, as a minimum, baseline physical and 
electrochemical tests, vibration to relevant levels (Appendix A) and vacuum leak 
checks with baseline physical and electrochemical tests performed before and 
after the vibration and vacuum leak checks.  The pass/fail criteria should be 
stringent.  For example, COTS battery programs use less than 1-percent change 
in OCV and mass and less than 3-percent capacity change as pass/fail criteria.  
If greater than 3 percent of the lot fails, then the lot is rejected.   
For COTS lithium-ion button cells of up to 1000 mAh capacity, flight cells should 
undergo acceptance testing that includes functional test with weight checks, 
visual inspection, and open-circuit and closed-circuit voltage verification.   
Lithium-ion button cells that cannot be removed from the equipment (e.g., cell 
soldered to circuit board) may be functionally checked at the end-item level. 
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 Figure 6.4.3-3.  COTS Battery Acceptance Flow 
 
6.5 Lithium/Lithium-ion Polymer Secondary Batteries 
 
6.5.1  Definition 
 
Lithium/lithium-ion polymer batteries are rechargeable batteries and have polymer 
blends in the cathode or anode or separator or in all three.  In the polymer cells, flat, 
bonded electrodes are used to enable the fabrication of thin cells.  The cells could be 
made in flexible shapes and sizes and packaged in aluminized plastic pouches.  
Although the commercial market labels all polymer batteries as “lithium-polymer” 
batteries, most of those in the market today are of the lithium-ion polymer type.  These 
are called lithium-ion polymers as they contain electrode formulations and some liquid 
electrolyte that are similar in composition to lithium-ion cells and do not contain a purely 
polymeric electrolyte or lithium metal electrode. 
   
The electrochemical nature of these cells is very similar to the liquid electrolyte lithium-
ion cells dealt with in the previous section.  These cells have a LiMO2 cathode (M = Co, 
Ni, Mn, or combinations of these).  The commonly used cathodes in lithium/lithium-ion 
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polymer cells are Li-Mn2O4 spinel compounds.  The anode can be any form of carbon, 
namely, natural and synthetic graphites, mesophase carbon micro beads (MCMB), or 
carbon fibers (lithium-ion polymer cells).  The anode can also be lithium metal (lithium 
polymer cells).  The electrolyte in these cells is made up of a combination of organic 
carbonates and a salt in a polymer matrix.  The most commonly used salt is LiPF6 
(lithium hexafluorophosphate).  The polymers commonly used are based on 
polyacrylonitriles (PANs), PVDF-based polymers (PVDF-HFP, PVDF-CTFE), polyvinyl 
chloride (PVC), etc.  In some cases, an ancillary plasticizer such as dibutyl phthalate is 
incorporated into the resin, which facilitates the densification of the electrodes under low 
temperature and pressure.  The plasticizer is later vaporized or removed by a suitable 
solvent extraction process.  The charge and discharge in the lithium/lithium-ion cells 
occurs in a manner similar to that described in Section 6.4. 
 
The nominal voltage of the lithium-ion polymer cells with the cobaltate cathode is about 
3.6 V and the energy density obtained can range from 145 to 190 Wh/kg.  The lithium-
ion polymer cells with the manganese spinel cathode have a nominal voltage of about 
3.8 V and have energy densities in the range of 130 to 144 Wh/kg.  The typical charging 
protocol for the lithium/lithium-ion polymer cells includes a constant current charge to a 
voltage of 4.1 V or  
4.2 V (depending on the metal oxide cathode and manufacturer’s recommendations) 
and held at constant voltage until the current falls down to approximately C/100 (this 
can vary according to the manufacturer).  Due to the unique charging characteristic of 
the lithium-ion cells and batteries, charging should be performed with a dedicated 
charger only.  This charger can be a “smart” charger in some cases.  Lithium polymer 
cells may sometimes require higher temperatures for operation (about 60 ºC (140 ºF)).  
The discharge of the cell depends on the load used, but the end voltage during 
discharge should not go below 2.5 V.  Typical end-of-discharge voltages for the 
batteries in different equipment have been 3.0 V/cell.  Internal resistance for the lithium-
ion polymer cells varies from 20 to 60 mΩ for small (0.5 to 15 Ah) cells and is expected 
to drop with increased capacity cells. 
 
Lithium/lithium-ion polymer cells are typically flat and thin.  The cells are packaged in 
vapor-impermeable, flexible, multilayer metalized polymer bags.  The polymer cells are 
typically made up of a positive electrode plate and a negative electrode plate bonded to 
two opposite sides of an ionically conductive separator.  The plates can be stacked as 
individual plates, Z-folded, or folded in other ways depending on the mechanical 
properties of the individual component layers.  A large-capacity cell would thus have 
several plates stacked on each other to give the capacity required.  Another common 
method of cell stacking is the “bicell” configuration, where the central plate (typically a 
negative electrode) is shared by two positive plates on either side.  There is a layer of 
separator between the center negative plate and the two positive plates on either side.  
Several bicells can be stacked to give a larger capacity cell. 
 
Polymer cells typically perform well at low rates of charge and discharge.  However, 
cells can be made for specific medium and high rate applications.  Because of the 
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higher resistance caused by the polymer materials used in the electrodes and 
separator, currently, a small quantity of liquid electrolyte is added to improve ionic 
conductivity.   
 
The SOC and temperature at which the cells are stored or cycled greatly affects the 
irreversible capacity loss in the cells.  These are similar to the liquid lithium-ion cells.  
 
The polymer cells do not have the same safety features that a liquid lithium-ion cell 
would have.  The only safety feature in the cell is the shutdown separator that works in 
a manner similar to that of the liquid systems.  With the polymer cells, due to the nature 
of the cell design and package, the cell seals lose integrity under abusive conditions, 
leading to electrolyte leakage.  But, due to the presence of very little electrolyte 
compared with the liquid cells, the hazards associated with them are less.  The 
presence of the gel polymer can cause a self-healing process in instances of nail 
penetration in a fully charged state and hence reduces the occurrence of explosions or 
fires. 
 
6.5.2 Hazard Sources 
 
The main abuse conditions that cause hazardous conditions in lithium/lithium-ion 
polymer cells are the result of overcharge, internal and external shorts, and high 
temperatures.  These are similar to those for the liquid lithium-ion cells, discussed in 
Section 5.4.  However, the polymer lithium-ion cells have additional problems with 
electrolyte leakage under abusive conditions and corrosion of polymer pouches.  These 
pouch-design cells are also intolerant to vacuum conditions and undergo swelling.   
 
6.5.3 Controls/Process Guidelines 
 
The controls for the polymer cell batteries are similar to those for the lithium-ion liquid 
systems.  The battery should be failure tolerant to overcharge, over-discharge 
conditions, external short (high and low impedance), and extreme temperature hazards.   
Although an over-discharge condition has not been deemed to be a hazard in lithium-
ion cells, subsequent charges can cause a hazardous condition in one or more cells in a 
multi-cell pack.  The controls and processes listed in Sections 5 and 6.4 (lithium-ion) 
should be used as applicable to incorporate safety controls into the battery design.  
 
In addition, the following should be taken into account while using the lithium-ion 
polymer cells. 
 
a. The lithium-ion polymer cells should be tested in an environment of 8 to 10 psi 
pressure for the flight acceptance leak test rather than the vacuum (~0.1 psi) or 
deep vacuum  
(below ~10–4 Torr).  In addition, the pouch cell designs should be leak tested with 
the pressure restraints on the wide faces of the cells to prevent damage due to 
pouch expansion.  The restraint pressure should be obtained from the cell 
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manufacturer.  The cells should be restrained at all times to prevent inadvertent 
swelling during storage, cycling, and low pressure or vacuum environments. 
b. Cells should be stringently monitored for any signs of voltage decay, visual 
evidence of external corrosion, or inadequate isolation of the terminals from the 
pouch. 
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6.6 Lithium Primary Batteries 
 
6.6.1 Definition 
 
Lithium batteries of the primary or nonrechargeable type are of several different 
chemistries.  In most cases, primary lithium cells have a lithium metal anode.  Cells of 
this chemistry have a nonaqueous electrolyte that is either organic or inorganic in 
nature.  Depending on the cathode present, the nominal voltage of the cell differs.  The 
most commonly used lithium primary batteries for space applications are lithium 
manganese dioxide (Li-MnO2), lithium iron disulfide (LiFeS2), lithium polycarbon 
monofluoride (LiCFx), lithium thionyl chloride (Li-SOCl2), and lithium bromine chloride 
complex (Li-BCX).  The less commonly used ones are lithium sulfur dioxide (Li-SO2) 
and lithium sulfuryl chloride (Li-SO2Cl2). 
 
The half-cell reactions, chemistry, and operating voltage details are provided below for 
the most commonly used lithium primary batteries. 
 
The half reactions for the Li-MnO2 cell chemistry are: 
 
Anode:   Li    Li+ + e- 
Cathode:  MnIVO2 + Li+ + e-  MnIIIO2(Li+) 
The overall reaction is: Li + MnIVO2    MnIIIO2(Li+) 
The cathode is made up of solid heat treated MnO2, and the electrolyte is a mixture of 
propylene carbonate or butylene carbonate and dimethoxyethane, along with a salt 
such as lithium perchlorate or lithium trifluoroethylacetate (triflate).  The OCV of this cell 
chemistry is 3.3 V.  The nominal or operating voltage of the cell is 3.0 V.  Caution 
should be exercised in using cells with an OCV greater than 3.3 V.  Higher voltages 
accelerate corrosion and lead to significant reduction in the calendar life of the battery. 
 
The half reactions for the Li CFx are: 
 
Anode:   xLi    xLi+ + xe- 
Cathode: (CF)x + xe-   xC + xF- 
The overall reaction is: xLi + (CF)x    xLiF + xC 
The cathode is solid polycarbon monofluoride, and the electrolyte is a mixture of 
gamma- butyrolactone with a salt such as lithium tetrafluoroborate.  In coin cells, 
dimethoxyethane is also added to the solvent mixture.  The OCV is 3.2 V, and the 
operating voltage is between 2.5 to 2.6 V, which drops down further under higher loads.  
Voltage delays are common with this chemistry, especially at low temperatures, and 
predischarge is typically performed to remove this feature. 
 
The half reactions for the LiFeS2 are shown on the following page: 
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Anode:  4Li     4Li+ + 4e  
Cathode:  FeS2 + 4e    Fe + 2S2  
The overall reaction is: 4 Li + FeS2    Fe + 2Li2S 
The cathode is a solid iron disulfide (FeS2), and the electrolyte is a mixture of organic 
solvents such as dimethoxyethane and dioxolane and a salt such as lithium iodide.  The 
OCV of the cells is as high as 1.9 V, and its nominal voltage is 1.5 V.  The operating 
voltage range is from about 1.6 V to 1.0 V, and the cells are capable of providing up to a 
C rate discharge.  
 
The half reactions for the Li-SOCl2 cell are: 
 
Anode: Li     Li+ + e- 
Cathode: 2SOCl2 + 2e-   SO2 + S + 4Cl- 
The overall reaction is: 4Li + 2SOCl2   4LiCl + SO2 + S 
 
The catholyte is a mixture of thionyl chloride and lithium aluminum tetrachloride on high-
surface-area carbon.  The OCV is 3.7 V, and the nominal operating voltage for the 
former is 
3.5 V. 
 
The half reactions for the Li-BCX cell are: 
 
Anode: Li     Li+ + e- 
Cathode: 2SOCl2.BrCl + 2e-   SO2 + S + 3Cl2 + Br2 
The overall reaction is: 6Li + 2SOCl2.BrCl   4LiCl + SO2 + S + 2LiBr 
 
The catholyte in Li-BCX cells is a mixture of thionyl chloride (SOCl2), lithium aluminum 
tetrachloride, and bromine chloride (BrCl), with a SOCl2 to BrCl ratio of 6:1.  The OCV 
for  
Li-BCX is approximately 3.8 to 3.9 V, with an operating voltage of 3.6 V. 
 
6.6.2 Hazard Sources 
 
Lithium batteries have very high energy densities compared with other batteries, as 
shown by Table 6.6.2-1. 
 
Table 6.6.2-1.  Energy Density of Different Cell Chemistries (Manufacturer's Data) 
 Chemistry Watt-hr/lb Watt-hr/cu. in. 
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Alkaline manganese D-cell 37 3.8 
Carbon-zinc D-cell 17 1.2 
Lithium-BCX D-cell 175 16.9 
Mercuric oxide D-cell 41 5.7 
Silver oxide-zinc rectangular cell 80 7.0 
 
Under unique and abusive conditions, lithium cells can be made to yield their contained 
energy suddenly and explosively.  Some of these conditions are: 
 
a. Any condition that results in the lithium anode reaching its melting point of 180°C 
(356°F) is a hazardous condition.  Discharging lithium cells at a high rate 
produces heat; therefore, a lithium battery must be designed to safely remove 
that heat.  High temperatures can also be caused by an external heat source, an 
external short circuit, or physical abuse (e.g., crushing or penetration by a sharp 
object) that results in an internal short or a manufacturing defect resulting in an 
internal short. 
b. Discharging a cell until its voltage falls to 0 volts and then overdischarging the 
cell by forcing it into negative voltage, whether by cells in series with it or by 
another power supply, can result in cell rupture and/or explosion. 
c. Charging lithium cells can result in cell rupture and/or explosion.  Parallel 
combinations between cells, batteries, and power sources may force a charging 
current through a stack of cells containing a weak or dead cell.   
d. A toxicity hazard is presented by certain lithium cells that contain a pressure 
relief vent.  Cell overpressurization under certain abuse conditions may release 
such toxic gases as sulfur dioxide, thionyl chloride, and/or hydrogen chloride, 
depending on the type of lithium battery, into the space vehicle environment.  
Batteries with an electrolyte toxicity of level 4 should not be used in the habitable 
environment (irrespective of size) of a space vehicle.  Examples of such battery 
chemistries are lithium-sulfur dioxide, lithium-sulfuryl chloride, lithium-thionyl 
chloride, and Li-BCX.  
e. Internal shorts due to manufacturing defects and/or contamination. 
 
6.6.3 Controls/Process Guidelines 
 
a. Lithium primary batteries should be failure tolerant to inadvertent charge, over-
discharge into reversal, external shorts, and high temperatures.   
b. All primary lithium batteries with capacity in excess of the non-critical limits 
should be tested for tolerance to internal shorts using simulated internal short 
tests (see internal shorts).   Those that are intolerant to internal shorts (i.e., they 
exhibit leakage, venting, explosion, or fire) should undergo a higher vibration 
screening before flight. 
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c. Lithium cell and battery temperatures should be controlled such that the 
temperature during operation remains below the manufacturer's stated upper 
temperature limit, for example, 71°C (159.8°F) for Li-BCX.  Testing should be 
done to verify safe performance at the operating temperature limits if the 
manufacturer’s recommended limits will be exceeded for any application.   
d. Thermal sensors, switches, or fuses set to open at the appropriate temperature 
should be installed in batteries containing lithium primary cells if the temperature 
of the battery is expected to exceed its safe rating.    
e. Both external and internal heat sources should be controlled in the battery 
design, as detailed in Section 5 on high temperatures. 
f. Overcurrent protection devices, such as fuses or circuit breakers, should be 
provided for lithium cells regardless of whether or not the cells have self-
contained fuses.  Protective devices should be rated above the highest likely load 
current but should have a low enough rating to prevent any form of external short 
circuit on the cell or battery.  See Section 4.5 for more details on short circuit 
protection. 
g. Wherever more than one lithium cell is used in series, each cell in the series 
string should have redundant parallel bypass diodes attached to them so that the 
diodes become conductive at the smallest possible negative voltage in order to 
provide over-discharge protection (see Figure 6.6.3-1).  Overcurrent devices, 
such as fuses or PTCs, should be in series to the cells to prevent bypass diode 
failures from causing external short hazards in the cells.  In selecting a shunt 
diode for the battery design, strive for the least negative value. 
h. Non-Critical button cells which are used as backup power sources for computer 
memories, clocks, etc., may use a high-value resistor to limit a potential charging 
current. 
 
Figure 6.6.3-1.  Fuse and Diode Protection of a Cell 
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i. If the battery design utilizes parallel strings of cells to obtain the desired current, 
each string should contain redundant blocking diodes in series with each string of 
cells.  Batteries that are in parallel with external power sources should be 
equipped with charge-current blocking devices (see Figure 6.6.3-2).  (The 
blocking diodes as shown below provide redundancy for both safety and mission 
success if a diode fails open or short-circuited.  For just safety, only two blocking 
diodes in series are required.) 
 
Figure 6.6.3-2.  Redundant Parallel Blocking Diodes for each Series String in a Parallel-
Series Battery Combination 
 
j. Primary lithium button cells, such as Li-(CF)x, Li-iodine, Li-V2O5, and Li-MnO2, 
which fall under the non-critical category require the cell specification, require UL 
or international standard verification data and safety circuitry for review and 
approval on a Unique Hazard Report.  The cells should be acceptance-tested 
with weight checks, visual inspection, and open-circuit and closed-circuit voltage 
checks. For those that cannot be removed from the equipment, a functional 
check along with UL (or similar) safety test data should be supplied.   
k. All other batteries that do not fall under the Non-Critical category should undergo 
engineering, qualification, and flight acceptance tests for each unique application 
and a unique hazard report should be completed.    
l. All flight batteries that do not fall under the Non-Critical category should undergo 
acceptance testing that includes visual inspection and testing for OCV, closed-
circuit voltage, vibration to flight requirement levels or higher (Appendix A), and 
vacuum leak checks with weight and voltage measurements performed before 
and after each test.   
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m. All inorganic electrolyte lithium primary cells should be verified to have 
undergone  
X-rays at the cell manufacturing facility. 
n. All the DFMR measures against cell internal shorts that are required for and 
mentioned in previous sections for lithium-ion (and that don’t involve cycling) 
should be applied to lithium primary batteries. 
  
6.6.4 Certification Requirement for Handling Lithium Batteries 
 
Personnel who handle lithium batteries or cells at JSC are required to be certified per 
the Center requirements under provisions of JPR 1700.1, “JSC Safety and Health 
Handbook.”   
 
6.6.5 Application of UL Data 
 
The UL conducts abuse tests on several models of lithium cells.  Cells that pass the 
abuse tests receive UL recognition (distinct from approval) by cell number.  The UL test 
data can be used as a reference during battery review to determine whether adequate 
hazard controls have been incorporated in a lithium battery design.  The use of UL 
safety test data does not indicate that safety controls are not required. 
 
6.6.6 Prepackaged Multi-celled Batteries 
 
The use of prepackaged lithium batteries containing more than one cell should still 
contain the necessary hazard controls.  Modification of the prepackaged batteries may 
be required in order to incorporate the hazard controls into the final battery design. 
 
6.7 Nickel-Cadmium Batteries 
 
6.7.1 Definition 
 
While charging, nickel-cadmium cells produce a voltage with a gradually rising slope.  
When the cells are fully charged, the voltage begins to increase its rate of rise and then 
drops off due to the inverse relationship of voltage and temperature in nickel-cadmium 
cells.  This peak in the voltage curve is readily detected, normally on the negative slope, 
and the chargers are designed to use this to terminate the charge.  Alternatively, nickel-
cadmium battery charging may be terminated on the basis of an upward break in the 
temperature curve.   A timed cutoff is recommended as a backup for charge termination. 
 
The half reactions for the nickel-cadmium chemistry are: 
 
Anode:  Cd + 2OH-    Cd(OH)2 + 2e-  
Cathode:  NiO2 + 2H2O + 2e-   Ni(OH)2 + 2OH- 
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The overall reaction is: Cd +NiO2 + 2H2O    Cd(OH)2 + Ni(OH)2  
 
The cathode in the nickel-cadmium cell is made up of nickel oxyhydroxide (NiOOH), and 
the anode is made up of cadmium hydroxide [Cd(OH)2].  The electrolyte is 45 percent 
by weight of KOH, which is approximately 6 M concentration.  The OCV of nickel-
cadmium cells can be as high as 1.55 V, their nominal operating voltage is 1.2 V, and 
they are typically discharged down to 1.0 V per cell. 
 
6.7.2 Hazards 
 
Since nickel-cadmium cells undergo both charge and discharge, the battery hazards 
detailed in subsections of Section 5 should be accounted for in the battery design, 
especially the hazards associated with gas generation, high temperature, and 
charging.  While nickel-cadmium cells are designed to recombine gases produced 
during nominal charging conditions, these battery types have pressure relief vents set at 
200–300 psia. This vent is often a resealable type. There are welded seal aerospace-
type nickel-cadmium cells without a vent, and these cells are generally used on open-
frame designs. 
 
6.7.3 Controls/Process Guidelines 
 
a. The controls detailed in the subsections of Section 5 should be incorporated for 
nickel-cadmium batteries.   
b. The charge should be terminated by voltage slope and temperature sensing or 
by a rigid cutoff time with either voltage slope or temperature sensing.   
c. The charger should be tested under conditions representing the nominal 
operational mode, as well as under reasonable abuse scenarios (i.e., 
overcharge) for the intended application.  The tests should verify the successful 
operation of the charge termination method. 
d. Nickel-cadmium batteries and cells which fall under the non-critical category, a 
Unique Hazard Report and UL or international standard verification is sufficient 
for documentation of the battery.   
e. Non-Critical Nickel-cadmium batteries and cells should undergo acceptance 
testing that includes weight checks, visual inspection, and open-circuit and 
closed-circuit voltage checks. For those that cannot be removed from the 
equipment, a functional check along with UL or international standard safety test 
data should be supplied.   
f. In all cases, the cell specification and the safety circuitry should be provided with 
the Unique Hazard Reports. 
g. COTS nickel-cadmium batteries in the Critical category should be documented 
on a Unique Hazard Report and include description of manufacturer’s 
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specification, the battery protective features, and charger schematics to describe 
two-fault tolerance for catastrophic hazards. 
 
6.8 Nickel-Hydrogen Batteries 
 
6.8.1  Definition 
 
Nickel-hydrogen batteries utilize essentially the same positive electrode and electrolyte 
as nickel-cadmium cells and a platinum catalyst negative electrode.  This battery does 
not suffer a fate similar to other nickel-based cells if overcharged or if over-discharged 
into reversal.  Nickel-hydrogen batteries exhibit maximum performance between -10°C 
and 0°C with performance dropping off sharply above 30°C.  Operational life exceeding 
60,000 low Earth orbit (LEO) cycles and more than 15 years of geosynchronous Earth 
orbit (GEO) cycling has been obtained in satellite use.  The expense of this battery 
generally dictates its use. 
 
The half reactions for the NiH2 are:  
 
Anode: 1/2 H2 + OH-    H2O + e-  
Cathode:  NiOOH + H2O + e-   Ni(OH)2 + OH-   
The overall reaction is: NiOOH + 1/2 H2    Ni(OH)2   
The anode in NiH2 cells is the hydrogen electrode, which is hydrogen gas in a 
compressed state and a Teflon bonded platinum black catalyst that is supported on a 
photo-etched nickel substrate. The cathode is similar to the other nickel chemistries and 
is composed of nickel hydroxide impregnated on a porous nickel sintered plaque.  The 
electrolyte is concentrated KOH, but it varies in concentration depending on the 
application.  The concentration of KOH in a fully discharged cell used for LEO 
applications ranges from 26 to 31 percent, and from 31 to  
38 percent in those used for GEO applications.  The nominal voltage for this battery 
chemistry is  
1.2 V. 
 
6.8.2  Hazard Sources 
 
The principal hazard associated with nickel-hydrogen batteries is the high-pressure 
hydrogen in fully charged cells, 800–1,000 psia.  Internal pressure is directly 
proportional to the relative SOC.  These cells are welded seal, leak-before-burst 
designs without relief valves and can typically found in open-frame battery designs. 
 
6.8.3  Controls/Process Guidelines 
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The nickel-hydrogen cell container is considered a thin-walled pressure vessel and 
should be designed and certified to leak before burst to ensure that breaching the 
container does not result in release of shrapnel.  Special arrangements need to be 
made well in advance of launch of any nickel-hydrogen battery that will require crew 
handling.  See Section 5.1.1.1 for requirements for pressure vessels.  
 
6.9 Nickel-Metal Hydride Batteries 
 
6.9.1 Definition 
 
Nickel-metal hydride cells became commercially available in the early 1990’s as 
replacements for nickel-cadmium cells.  In part this was sparked by new limits on the 
allowable cadmium in the manufacturing work place.  Nickel-metal hydride cells typically 
provide up to twice the capacity for the same size nickel-cadmium cell and experience 
less of the "memory effect" characteristic of nickel-cadmium cells.  The voltage and 
discharge parameters of both chemistries are sufficiently similar to allow the 
interchange of nickel-cadmium and nickel-metal hydride cells for discharge purposes.  
However, the intricacies of the charge characteristics of nickel-metal hydride cells differ 
enough from the nickel-cadmium cells that nickel-cadmium chargers cannot be safely 
used to charge nickel-metal hydride cells in the habitable environment of a spacecraft. 
 
The half reactions for the nickel-metal hydride are: 
 
Anode: MH + OH-   M + H2O + e- (M = metal alloy)  
Cathode:  NiOOH + H2O + e-    Ni(OH)2 + OH-  
The overall reaction is: NiOOH + MH    Ni(OH)2 + M  
 
The cathode is nickel oxyhydroxide, and the anode is typically one of two types of 
metallic alloys.  One such alloy is the misch metal type that is made up of rare earth 
alloys of lanthanum nickel (LaNi5) known as the AB5 class, and another is made up of 
titanium and zirconium known as the AB2 class.  Substitutions of the misch metal alloys 
can be made with Ce, Nd, Pr, Gd, and Y in the place of La.  In the case of AB2 types, 
major substitutions by the use of V, Ti, and Zr provide improved hydrogen storage.  
Other metal substitutions are made in both cases to suppress corrosion that would 
result in longer life.  The electrolyte is typically 30 percent by weight of KOH.  The OCV 
for the nickel-metal hydride is similar to the nickel-cadmium and is approximately 1.55 to 
1.6 V.  The nominal or operating voltage of the cell is 1.2 V, and the cell is discharged 
down to 1.0 V. 
 
Nickel-metal hydride cells exhibit a gradually rising slope to the discharge curve while 
charging.   However, the negative slope at completion of charge is not as significant as 
with nickel-cadmium cells.  The negative slope may go undetected, especially at the 
lower charge rates, forcing the cells into overcharge.  For this reason, chargers 
designed strictly for nickel-cadmium batteries cannot be used to charge nickel-metal 
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hydride cells and/or batteries.  The nickel-metal hydride charger should be designed to 
terminate the charge on a characteristic other than the negative voltage slope in 
addition to the negative voltage slope.  Chargers designed specifically for nickel-metal 
hydride cells often terminate charge when the voltage changeover time is zero.  
Alternatively, the charge is terminated on the basis of an upward break in the 
temperature curve.  A timed cutoff is recommended as a backup for charge termination. 
 
6.9.2 Hazards 
 
Since nickel-metal hydride cells undergo both charge and discharge, the battery 
hazards detailed in subsections of Section 5 should be accounted for in the battery 
design, especially the hazards associated with gas generation, high temperature, and 
charging.  While both are designed to recombine gases produced during nominal 
charging conditions, these battery types have pressure relief vents set at 200–300 psia.  
This vent is often a resealable type. 
 
6.9.3 Controls/Process Guidelines 
 
a. The controls detailed in the subsections of Section 5 should be incorporated for 
nickel-metal hydride batteries.   
b. The charge should be terminated by voltage slope and temperature sensing or 
by a rigid cutoff time with either voltage slope or temperature sensing.  
c.  The charger should be tested under conditions representing the nominal 
operational mode as well as under reasonable abuse scenarios (i.e., overcharge) 
for the intended application.  The tests should verify the successful operation of 
the charge termination method.  An example of acceptance and lot testing of 
cells is provided in EP-WI-014 B. 
d. Nickel-metal hydride batteries and cells which fall under the non-critical category 
should be documented on a Unique Hazard Report which includes UL or 
international standard verification evidence.   
e. Non-Critical Nickel-metal hydride batteries and cells should undergo acceptance 
testing which includes weight checks, visual inspection, and open-circuit and 
closed-circuit voltage checks.  Evidence of acceptance testing should be 
included in the Unique Hazard Report. 
f. For Non-Critical nickel-metal hydride batteries and cells that cannot be removed 
from the equipment, a functional check along with UL or international standard 
safety verification should be supplied on the Unique Hazard Report. 
g. In all cases, the cell specification and the safety circuitry should be provided with 
the Unique Hazard Report. 
h. COTS nickel-metal hydride batteries in the Critical category can be listed on a 
Unique Hazard Report which includes the manufacturer’s specification, battery 
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protective features, and charger schematics to support two-fault tolerance to 
catastrophic hazards. 
 
6.10 Silver-Zinc Batteries 
 
6.10.1 Definition 
 
Although silver-zinc batteries have limited cycle life, they are frequently used because of 
their high energy density, for example, in the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU).  
 
The half reactions are: 
 
Anode: Zn       Zn2+ + 2e-   
 Zn2+ + 2OH-   Zn(OH)2    
Cathode: 2AgO + H2O + 2e-   Ag2O + 2OH-  
  Ag2O + 2H2O + 2e-  2Ag + 2OH-  
The overall reaction is: Ag2O + Zn + H2O    Zn(OH)2 + Ag 
The anode is a zinc electrode supported by a silver or copper current collector.  The 
cathode is silver oxide on a silver grid that serves as the current collector.  Silver is in its 
pure metallic form during discharge and is converted to silver (II) oxide (AgO) at the end 
of full charge.  An intermediate product that is formed is silver (I) oxide or monovalent 
silver oxide (Ag2O).  The electrolyte is KOH with an optimum concentration of 45 
percent, which is corrosive and can cause burns on the skin and damage to equipment.  
The OCV for a silver-zinc cell is typically 1.86 V at room temperature. 
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6.10.2 Hazard Sources 
 
The main safety concern is electrolyte leakage.  It should be noted that if it is necessary 
to top off the electrolyte, one should add only electrolyte and not water, as water alone 
will lead to degradation of the cell separator. 
 
6.10.3 Controls/Process Guidelines 
 
a. The controls associated with electrolyte leakage, as discussed in subsections of 
Section 5, apply.   
b. Cells with free electrolyte and that generate gases even while at open circuit, 
such as in silver-zinc, should be designed with a relief valve in line with the vent 
port with liquid absorbent material to allow "burping" of gases but to trap liquid 
electrolyte, especially during the atmospheric pressure changes, which occur 
with launch and reentry.  
c. Battery cases, such as those for silver-zinc batteries, should have redundant 
pressure relief valves.  The relief valve on the cell itself can be used as one level 
of control, wherever applicable. 
d. Cell vents in silver-zinc cells should be made out of noncorrosive or corrosion-
resistant materials.  A cell vent made of metallic materials could possibly 
contribute to the formation of shorting paths.  In addition, corroded vents can 
easily plug up, contributing to an energetic release of gases and electrolyte. 
e. For silver-zinc batteries that have a relatively low pressure relief valve, whenever 
possible during prelaunch stowage, the batteries should be oriented "upright" 
relative to the launch gravity-vector so that any free electrolyte will be forced by 
the earth's gravity and the launch acceleration into the cell away from cell seals 
or vents.   
f. Silver-zinc batteries and cells in the non-critical category should use a Unique 
Hazard Report for documentation of the battery.   
i. Non-Critical Silver-zinc batteries and cells should undergo acceptance testing 
that includes weight checks, visual inspection, and open-circuit and closed-circuit 
voltage checks.  Evidence of acceptance testing should be included in the 
Unique Hazard Report. 
g. For Non-Critical silver-zinc batteries and cells that cannot be removed from the 
equipment, a functional check along with UL or international standard safety test 
data should be supplied in the Unique Hazard Report.   
h. In all cases, the cell specification and the safety circuitry should be provided with 
the standardized hazard reports. 
i. For batteries which do not satisfy Non-Critical criteria and that are rechargeable, 
acceptance test cycles should be performed on the flight batteries.   
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j. COTS silver-zinc batteries in the Critical category can be documented on a 
Unique Hazard Report with manufacturer’s specification, battery protective 
features, and charger schematics provided to support two-fault tolerance to 
catastrophic hazards. 
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6.11 Zinc-Air Batteries 
 
6.11.1 Definition 
 
Zinc-air batteries have a high energy density since the bulk of the cell contains only one 
of the reactants: zinc.  Oxygen from the air is required to complete the chemical reaction 
that produces voltage from a zinc-air cell.  The zinc-air battery should therefore contain 
air holes to let oxygen in, yet should also be sealed to prevent the leakage of 
electrolyte.  Using gas permeable, liquid impermeable material to cover the air holes 
makes this possible.  To prevent voltage loss during storage due to self-discharge 
reactions, the battery design should include an air barrier over the air holes (i.e., battery 
inside a bag or gas impermeable material placed over the air holes).  Removal of the air 
barrier when the battery is to be used will activate the cells by allowing air into the cell 
reactions.  In addition to these guidelines for zinc-air batteries, the following hazards 
must also be considered.  
 
6.11.2 Hazard Sources 
 
a. Hydrogen gas is generated by the chemical reaction between the KOH 
electrolyte and the zinc anode.  The hydrogen generation rate is 0.01 cc 
hydrogen/hr/gram of zinc for 0.5 percent mercury amalgamated zinc at 21.1°C 
(70°F), based on silver-zinc chemistry.  The hydrogen generation rate doubles or 
halves with each 10°C increase or decrease, respectively, in temperature 
(corresponding to a doubling or halving for every 18°F increase or decrease).  
The discharge rate also affects the rate of hydrogen generation. 
b. Zinc-air cells and battery cases require air holes in order to provide an access 
port for oxygen, a necessary reactant of the chemical reaction, which produces 
current.  The air holes are a potential leak point for the KOH electrolyte.  KOH is 
a strong base that can be caustic to eyes, mucous membranes, and skin and 
corrosive to most metals.  In addition to the air holes, another potential leak point 
is the gasket between the two parts of the cell can.  Also, charging zinc-air 
primary cells may cause cells to rupture, releasing the electrolyte. 
c. Other causes for hazards for zinc-air cells include short circuits, circulating 
currents, high temperature, and charging.  The details of these hazards are 
contained in their respective subsections of Section 5. 
 
6.11.3 Controls/Process Guidelines 
 
a. Accumulation of generated hydrogen gas should be minimized by providing vents 
in the battery.  The air holes, which bring oxygen to the cells, can also serve as 
vent holes for generated hydrogen.   
 
b. If a ventilated zinc-air battery is installed inside another container, the second 
container should also have a relief vent for hydrogen. 
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c. The air holes in zinc-air should be covered with a material, such as Gore-Tex® 
fabric, which is permeable to air but impermeable to the electrolyte.   
 
d. The battery case, potting material, and case sealants should be made of 
materials that are compatible with the strong base potassium hydroxide 
electrolyte. 
 
e. The zinc-air battery design should have controls for short circuits, circulating 
currents, high temperature, and charge prevention as detailed in their respective 
subsections of Section 4.0. 
 
f. Zinc-air batteries and cells which satisfy Non-Critical criteria should be 
documented on a Unique Hazard Report and include evidence for UL or 
international standard verification.   
 
g. Non-Critical Zinc-air batteries and cells should undergo acceptance testing that 
includes weight checks, visual inspection, and open-circuit and closed-circuit 
voltage checks. Evidence of acceptance testing should be included in the Unique 
Hazard Report. 
h. For Non-Critical zinc-air batteries and cells that cannot be removed from the 
equipment, a functional check along with UL or international standard safety test 
data should be supplied on a Unique Hazard Report. 
  
6.12 Lithium-Sulfur 
 
6.12.1  Definition 
 
Lithium-sulfur (Li-S) is a rechargeable battery chemistry that has been researched and 
improved in the past decade.  Although the theoretical energy density of this battery 
chemistry is at  
2,500 Wh/kg, the practical energy density at 400 Wh/kg is still the highest achievable for 
any rechargeable battery chemistry.  This type of battery chemistry would offer 
tremendous savings in mass.  However, due to the decomposition products formed 
during the charge/discharge process, the cycle life of this chemistry at this time is 
extremely limited.  The half-reactions for the lithium-sulfur chemistry are the following: 
 
Anode:   S8 → Li2S8 → Li2S6 → Li2S4 → Li2S3 
Cathode:   Li2S → Li2S2 → Li2S3 → Li2S4 → Li2S6 → Li2S8 → S8 
 
The anode of the lithium-sulfur cell is made up of lithium metal, and the cathode is liquid 
sulfur.  The electrolyte is made up of dioxolane and a salt such as bis(trifluoromethane 
sulfonimide).  The cell is initially made up of a solid sulfur cathode which goes into 
solution when charged.  At the anode, lithium is dissolved during discharge and plates 
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out on the anode during charge.  The sulfur (S8) cathode combines with lithium to form 
Li2S8, Li2S6, Li2S3, Li2S2, and Li2S.  The higher polysulfides, such as Li2S8, are present 
at the higher states of charge.  The lower polysulfides, such as Li2S, are present at the 
lower states of charge.  The operating voltage range for the lithium-sulfur cell is 
between 2.5 to 1.7 V. 
 
6.12.2 Hazards 
 
The hazards associated with lithium-sulfur cells are similar to most other lithium-based 
rechargeable battery chemistries.  Under abuse conditions such as overcharge and 
external short, due to the presence of a flammable electrolyte and lithium metal the cells 
can vent and burn until all the electrolyte and active material has been consumed.   
 
6.12.3  Controls/Process Guidelines 
 
a. Lithium-sulfur cells should be two-fault tolerant to overcharge, over-discharge 
into reversal, external short, and high temperatures. 
b. Lithium-sulfur cells should be screened for internal shorts using the vibration 
method. 
c. All lithium-sulfur batteries should undergo engineering, qualification, and flight 
acceptance tests for each unique application.   
d. Qualification testing should include vibration to a higher level as for cells 
intolerant to internal shorts.  
e. Lot testing should be performed on 3 to 6 percent of every new lot of cells and 
batteries procured for the same application.  
f. All flight lithium-sulfur cells and batteries should be from a single lot and should 
undergo open-circuit and closed-circuit voltage tests, vibration to a higher level 
for cells intolerant to internal shorts, and vacuum tests with functional 
charge/discharge cycles performed before and after each test. 
g. All lithium-sulfur cells should be transported  in accordance with domestic or 
international standards. 
h. All lithium-sulfur cells should be visually inspected before removing from shipping 
containers. 
i. Lithium-sulfur cells that are warm to the touch should be allowed to cool to room 
temperature.  If the cells do not cool down, they should be placed in mineral oil to 
neutralize the active materials in the cell. 
j. Lithium-sulfur cells should always be stored at temperatures between 0 and 
30°C. 
k. Lithium-sulfur cells should be discharged in the temperature range of –20 to 
45°C. 
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l. A lithium-sulfur cell fire should be extinguished by smothering with copper 
powder or with a Lith-X fire extinguisher and should not be disturbed for a 
minimum of 24 hours. 
 
6.13  Thermal Batteries 
 
6.13.1  Definition 
 
Thermal batteries are a form of reserve batteries and are used extensively in 
applications that require an indefinite stand time and long life.  They are used in mines, 
missiles, nuclear weapons, etc., where they have to perform on demand.  They are 
used in applications that require an extremely reliable battery that can withstand 
extreme environmental stresses such as shock and spin.  The battery, once activated, 
performs at a very high rate for a very short time, typically on the order of a few minutes.  
The batteries are activated by using a current pulse or by laser activation methods.  The 
most commonly used thermal battery is of the lithium iron disulfide type, which has 
lithium as the anode and iron disulfide as the cathode.  The electrolyte is a combination 
of lithium chloride, potassium chloride, and magnesium oxide.   
 
Although the basic unit of the battery chemistry is about 1.5 V, thermal batteries are 
made with the appropriate stacks of electrodes to provide the voltage desired.  The 
diameter and thickness of the electrodes determines the capacity of the battery, and the 
capacity is typically provided by the discharge life time rather than in ampere-hours.  
Hence, thermal batteries of different voltages as well as capacities can be 
manufactured.   
 
6.13.2  Hazards 
 
The hazards associated with thermal batteries are due to the high energies that can be 
released within very short periods.  Hazards are associated with inadvertent charge, 
over-discharge into reversal, external short circuits, crush, high temperatures during 
storage, as well as inadvertent activation of the batteries.   
 
6.13.3 Controls/Process Guidelines 
 
a. Thermal batteries should be failure tolerant to inadvertent charge, over-discharge 
into reversal, external short circuit, and high temperatures. 
b. Thermal batteries should be X-rayed to eliminate the presence of metallic or 
activate material particles in the cell stack. 
c. The welded seal of the thermal batteries should be maintained after exposure of 
the battery to 90 psig for one hour at room temperature. 
d. The voltage of the batteries when measured for less than 30 seconds prior to 
initiation should not exceed 3 mV.  The measurement should be taken with an 
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instrument with a minimum of 6 MOhm input resistance and less than 100 
picofarads of input capacitance. 
e. The insulation resistance of the battery when measured using 100 +/– 5 Vdc, 
prior to initiation, between the terminal and case or between the initiator terminal 
and either the positive or negative or between the positive and negative terminals 
should be greater than 20 MOhms.  Caution should be exercised during this test 
to avoid measurements between the two initiator terminals, as this would cause 
inadvertent activation of the battery. 
f. Flight acceptance testing should include tests from “c” to “e” on all flight batteries, 
as well as vibration to higher than typical levels for those intolerant to internal 
shorts. 
 
6.14   Capacitors/Supercapacitors 
 
Traditional capacitors and supercapacitors are used in several applications as alternate 
energy sources (in the place of or in conjunction with batteries) for space use.  
Capacitors do not have the same hazards as batteries, but with the advancement in 
capacitor technology and the invention of asymmetric as well as lithium-ion 
supercapacitors, the hazards associated with the use of capacitors as alternate energy 
sources may not remain the same as those of EEE parts, especially when used in a 
human-rated space environment. 
 
For traditional capacitors and supercapacitors used as alternate energy sources, a 
destructive analysis should be carried out to determine if any excess electrolyte is 
present.  In the absence of excess electrolyte and if the toxicological assessment 
indicates a toxicity rating lower than 2, then only open-circuit voltage measurements 
need to be recorded on flight units and requires documentation in the Unique Hazard 
Report.    In the presence of excess electrolyte (electrolyte droplets visually observed or 
obtained by centrifuging or squeezing electrodes) or if the toxicity rating is 2 or higher, 
then a safety assessment similar to that of batteries should be carried out. 
 
Asymmetric capacitors should undergo an assessment similar to that of batteries and 
depending on the chemistry, the relevant battery chemistry requirements and processes 
should be used.   For example, lithium-ion supercapacitors should be treated in a 
manner similar to lithium-ion batteries. 
 
Capacitors that are used in a non-“alternate energy source” application as standard 
circuit-board-level components (example “EEE part” applications) and that are non-
electrolytic, do not contain free/excess electrolyte, and are not of the asymmetric or 
lithium-ion type are not subject to the guidelines recommended herein.  Documentation 
of the safety of these components are verified via nominal hardware testing and 
acceptance processes used for EEE parts. 
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APPENDIX A: QUALIFICATION AND FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE 
VIBRATION TESTING FOR BATTERIES 
 
Flight Cell and Battery Pack Qualification Testing 
 
The qualification testing should be conducted at the cell level and the battery level (i.e., 
on the standalone battery), as well as at the integrated, top-level assembly (i.e., with the 
cells or battery pack installed in the top-level assembly).  Determination of the 
qualification and certification test plan is achieved via inputs from the battery evaluation 
process, the intended application, and the program (i.e., shuttle or station) 
requirements.  Typical testing includes functional checkout  
(i.e., operational, cycle), environmental (i.e., vibration, thermal, thermal vacuum), 
electromagnetic compatibility, power quality, or others as deemed appropriate for the 
specific hardware and application.  The vibration spectrum varies depending on the cell 
chemistry and tolerance of the cell to internal shorts.  The safety tests that are required 
to prove two-fault tolerance to catastrophic hazard should be performed as part of a 
qualification test program and repeated for each newly purchased lot of the same 
battery.  The flight cell and battery packs that form the flight lot can go into the flight 
acceptance testing after the qualification test has been successfully completed. 
 
A.1 Qualification Vibration Testing (QVT) for Batteries Tolerant to Internal 
Shorts 
 
The purpose of the QVT for those batteries that are tolerant to internal shorts is to 
demonstrate the ability of the component to withstand the stresses and accumulated 
fatigue damage resulting from the maximum random vibration environment.  The test 
duration in each of the three orthogonal axes should be equivalent to either the total 
AVT time the battery will experience or  
5 minutes, whichever is greater.  The test levels and spectrum are shown in Figure A-1 
and  
Table A-1. 
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Figure A-1.  Qualification Vibration Spectrum for Batteries and Cells Tolerant to  
Internal Shorts 
 
Table A-1.  Qualification Vibration Spectrum for Batteries and Cells  
Tolerant to Internal Shorts 
 
 
 
 
Test condition tolerances should be applied to the nominal values defined in Figure A-1 
and Table A-1.  A maximum allowable tolerance of +/–1.5 dB should be applied to the 
power spectral density values.  Any aspect of the test not specifically defined in this 
document should be conducted in accordance with the applicable requirement (e.g., 
SSP-41172,  
SSP-52005). 
  
FREQ (Hz) ASD (G2/Hz) dB/OCT Grms
20.00 0.025000 * *
80.00 0.100000 3.01 1.94
350.00 0.100000 0.00 5.55
2000.00 0.017500 -3.01 9.58
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A.2   QVT for Batteries Intolerant to Internal Shorts 
 
The purpose of the QVT for those batteries that are “intolerant” or “not tolerant” to 
internal shorts is to demonstrate the ability of the component to withstand the stresses 
and accumulated fatigue damage resulting from the maximum random vibration 
environment and to identify any potential internal short hazard.  The test duration in 
each of the three orthogonal axes should be equivalent to either the total AVT time the 
battery will experience or 5 minutes, whichever is greater.   
 
 
Figure A-2.  Qualification Vibration Spectrum for Batteries Intolerant to Internal Shorts 
 
Table A-2.  Qualification Vibration Spectrum for Batteries Intolerant to Internal Shorts 
 
 
Test condition tolerances should be applied to the nominal values defined in Figure A-2 
and Table A-2.  A maximum allowable tolerance of +/–1.5 dB should be applied to the 
power spectral density values.  Any aspect of the test not specifically defined in this 
document should be conducted in accordance with the applicable requirement (e.g., 
SP-T-0023, SSP-41172,  
SSP-52005). 
 
FREQ (Hz) ASD (G2/Hz) dB/OCT Grms
20.00 0.057600 * *
40.00 0.057600 0.00 1.07
70.00 0.144000 4.93 2.02
700.00 0.144000 0.00 9.74
2000.00 0.037440 -3.86 13.65
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A.3 Acceptance Vibration Testing (AVT) for Batteries Tolerant to Internal Shorts 
 
The purpose of the AVT for those batteries tolerant to internal shorts is to detect 
material and workmanship flaws prior to flight by subjecting the battery to a dynamic 
vibration environment.  The test duration in each of the three orthogonal axes should be 
no less than 1 minute.  The test levels and spectrum are shown in Figure A-3 and Table 
A-3. 
 
 
Figure A-3.  Flight Acceptance Vibration Spectrum for Batteries Tolerant to Internal 
Shorts 
 
Table A-3.  Flight Acceptance Vibration Spectrum for Batteries Tolerant to  
Internal Shorts 
 
 
 
Test condition tolerances should be applied to the nominal values defined in Figure A-3 
and Table A-3.  A maximum allowable tolerance of +/–1.5 dB should be applied to the 
power spectral density values.  Any aspect of the test not specifically defined in this 
document should be conducted in accordance with the applicable requirement (e.g., 
FREQ (Hz) ASD (G2/Hz) dB/OCT Grms
20.00 0.010000 * *
80.00 0.040000 3.01 1.22
350.00 0.040000 0.00 3.51
2000.00 0.007000 -3.01 6.06
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SP-T-0023, SSP-41172,  
SSP-52005). 
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A.4 AVT for Batteries Intolerant to Internal Shorts 
 
The purpose of the AVT for those batteries that are intolerant to internal shorts is to 
detect material and workmanship flaws prior to flight by subjecting the battery to a 
dynamic vibration environment and to identify any potential internal short hazard.  The 
test duration in each of the three orthogonal axes should be no less than 1 minute.   
 
 
Figure A-4.  Flight Acceptance Screening Vibration Spectrum for Batteries Intolerant to 
Internal Shorts 
 
Table A-4.  Flight Acceptance Screening Vibration Spectrum for Batteries  
Intolerant to Internal Shorts 
 
 
 
Test condition tolerances should be applied to the nominal values defined in Figure A-4 
and Table A-4.  A maximum allowable tolerance of +/–1.5 dB should be applied to the 
power spectral density values.  Any aspect of the test not specifically defined in this 
document should be conducted in accordance with the applicable requirement (e.g., 
SP-T-0023, SSP-41172,  
SSP-52005). 
FREQ (Hz) ASD (G2/Hz) dB/OCT Grms
20.00 0.028800 * *
40.00 0.028800 0.00 0.76
70.00 0.072000 4.93 1.43
700.00 0.072000 0.00 6.89
2000.00 0.018720 -3.86 9.65
JSC-20793 Rev D 
99 
See cover for full disclosure. Verify correct revision before use at 
https://qmsmasterlist.jsc.nasa.gov/Home.aspx/Organization/31. 
APPENDIX B: CUSTOM CELL MANUFACTURING FACILITY AUDITS 
 
The manufacturer’s cell production line used for making the flight cells should be 
audited to determine the following.   
 Cell production control documentation.  The production control document should 
define the procedure for defining impurities and the material specifications and 
inspections.  Stringent configuration control should be implemented.  It is advised 
that an independent analysis of incoming raw materials be carried out. 
 Quality control documents, material specifications with impurity level 
specifications, incoming goods inspection documentation, supplier batch impurity 
analysis documentation, and periodic third-party audits of the supplier’s 
certificates of analyses  
for, at a minimum, the components of the active electrode materials, electrolyte 
(or components of the electrolyte), separator, insulators, and any safety 
components. 
 The audit should confirm that the manufacturer is adhering to approved definition 
of cell lots.  
 Configuration control process.  This is essential when a particular project would 
not be able to accept changes to the baseline cell design due to the nature and 
criticality of the application.  Configuration control is applicable to custom cell 
designs and should be achieved with documentation that enables traceability to 
all tools, fixtures, machines, instruments, settings, environmental conditions, 
contaminant control, and pass/fail criteria for the production of a unique cell 
design.  Configuration control can also be defined as documentation that 
demonstrates a solid chain of custody from incoming materials to final assembly 
and vice versa.  
 Particulate and contaminant control documents and inspection of processes, and 
the methods used to minimize contaminants.  These environmental audits should 
verify that magnets, adhesive tapes, and vacuum extraction are employed along 
with documentation of particle count and equipment calibration.  The 
manufacturer’s procedure for collection of loose material produced during the 
production process should be audited.  Metal-on-metal contact and other sources 
of contamination should be minimized near cell production processes up through 
cell closure.  Examples of expected housekeeping measures to prevent 
contamination include dedicated or disposable footwear, hair caps, and lab 
coats, along with disposable gloves for all personnel in cell production areas up 
through cell closure.  In addition, air pressure, as used in air knifes and air 
showers, is an effective alternative method to control mobile contaminants.  It is 
important to control all contaminants in the vicinity of electrode manufacturing 
process before they become embedded into the electrode coatings, as visual 
inspection of final product will not identify embedded contaminants if these 
processes are not followed.  Manufacturers should implement effective 
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contamination control procedures for critical operations.  A DPA is a means of 
demonstrating effective contamination control. 
 The audit should objectively verify the effectiveness of contaminant mitigation 
measures for each process, through methods such as magnetic sampling.  The 
contaminants collected should be examined by various methods (optical, 
Scanning Electron Microscopy/ Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy).  
 Design documents for the cells, analysis records for actual manufactured cells, 
and action reports for any cells not meeting specification are all part of the 
configuration control process.   
 The burr control process, to include burr measurement equipment, calibration 
certificates, burr definition, cutting tool change procedures, and machine 
maintenance procedures and records, etc.  Sample testing for burr control should 
be witnessed; no burrs should be present in any of the cell components.  
 Electrode manufacturing process, including visual inspection of production line, 
testing carried out on line, testing of coating adherence, defect identification and 
classification, procedure for electrode extraction, electrode inspection procedure 
for uniform coating, defective electrode identification, examples of defective 
electrodes, electrode scrapping process, damaged electrode disposal, checking 
of manufacturing machines for cause of electrode defects, and detection of 
nonconforming cell cores. 
 Tension of the electrode winding process to confirm that this process is 
characterized, optimized, and controlled; inspection of cell assembly specification 
or confirmation that the cell core assembly processes have been characterized, 
optimized, and controlled to prevent damage to the cell core. 
 Cell assembly process, including the assembly of insulating materials, electrode 
alignment, positive and negative tab placement characterization, inspection of 
positioning of insulating plates, integrity of cell core assembly check using 
resistance/continuity tests, and equipment calibration for the equipment used for 
testing; X-rays of 100 percent of the cells to look for electrode alignment at the 
top and bottom of cells; and review of pass/fail criteria for X-ray inspection. 
 Cell aging and validation of aging process, including grading and sorting. 
 Cell screening process for removal of leaking cells and documentation of leaked 
cells. 
 Other processes, such as welding, are characterized and tested and have proper 
documentation. 
 Qualification process for new cell designs and qualification process of production 
cells. 
 Determine whether the vendor’s quality system meets the requirements of ISO 
9001. 
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Audits should be pre-coordinated with the manufacturer to allow for a thorough 
examination of the manufacturing facility during a production process.  The audit should 
enable the audit team to see all processes used by the production line for making the 
cell designs for a specific flight program while cells are being manufactured.  Witnessing 
of cell production used for the engineering evaluation and/or qualification phases of a 
flight program is recommended to allow the manufacturer to respond to any 
findings/observations compiled by the audit.  During the audit, the auditors should 
observe all cell manufacturing processes, from incoming inspection of materials to cell 
formation, cell closure, and testing.  At the end of the audit, the auditing team will 
analyze the list of findings and observations and resolve this with the entire team, 
including the cell manufacturer, before full production of the flight cell design is initiated.  
Acceptable cell manufacturing processes for crewed spacecraft batteries are those with 
processes that are consistent with those that achieve less than 1 ppm catastrophic cell 
internal short circuit failure rates.   
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APPENDIX C: SHELF AND SERVICE LIFE FOR VARIOUS 
CELL/BATTERY CHEMISTRIES 
 
Batteries and cells have both shelf (or calendar) life and service life.  For simplicity, 
single cells and multi-cell packs will be described as batteries.  Both parameters are 
dependent on the battery chemistry.  Both parameters should be specified while 
obtaining safety certification for the cells and batteries used for each unique application.  
The shelf life and service life vary depending on whether the batteries are primary 
(nonrechargeable) or secondary (rechargeable).   
 
The shelf or calendar life is described as the life of the battery wherein its components 
(internal and external) have been, historically and by test, proven to be stable and safe.  
This is provided by the cell or battery manufacturer.  The shelf life of batteries is 
affected by factors such as environment and usage.  Usage in environments beyond the 
manufacturer’s recommendation can cause irreversible damage to the batteries, 
lowering their shelf life.  Table C-1 provides the shelf life for the various chemistries.   
The shelf life of primary batteries should not be extended, as the components of the cell 
are manufactured to meet only the manufacturer’s stated shelf life.  For rechargeable 
batteries, this shelf life can be extended by carrying out cycle life testing, as this data 
will provide adequate evidence of the robustness of the cell components.  This testing 
includes performing at least five charge and discharge cycles on a representative 
sample from the stored lot.  If at least 90 percent of the required performance is 
obtained from the batteries, the life of the battery can be extended for  
2 years, and if at least 80 percent of the required performance is obtained, then the life 
can be extended for 1 year.  At the end of this period, testing can be repeated to extend 
the life again, until the battery is incapable of meeting the minimum performance 
requirements levied by the project. 
Table C-1.  Shelf life of Commonly Used Cell/Battery Chemistries 
Chemistry Shelf life 
Li-BCX, Li-SOCl2, Li-SO2Cl2, 
Li-SO2, Li-MnO2, LiCFx 
10 years 
Li-FeS2 15 years 
Alkaline and silver oxide 7 years 
Ag-Zn primary 30 to 45 days wet life 
Li-ion (liquid), NiMH, NiCd 5 years 
Li-ion (polymer) 3 years 
Ag-Zn rechargeable 3 years 
 
The service life is the performance a battery can provide in a certain application.  This is 
also affected by factors such as environment and usage.  For example, exposure to 
long periods of high temperatures will cause the batteries to exceed performance at the 
beginning of life due to the lowered internal resistance at high temperatures but will 
reduce their service life rapidly due to the decomposition of active materials.   The 
service life depends on the application and the battery capacity.   For a primary battery, 
the capacity of the battery should be chosen to provide the required period of 
JSC-20793 Rev D 
103 
See cover for full disclosure. Verify correct revision before use at 
https://qmsmasterlist.jsc.nasa.gov/Home.aspx/Organization/31. 
performance.  For example, if a primary battery is required to power a device 
continually, then the load on the battery and the period it is expected to provide that 
power should be taken into consideration to determine the size (capacity) of the battery.  
When obtaining battery certification, both the load and the period of use that reflects the 
service life required will have to be provided.  For rechargeable batteries, apart from the 
capacity factor, the service life is provided as cycle life, or the number of times it can be 
recharged.  This is dependent on the battery chemistry.  For example, some 
rechargeable silver-zinc batteries have a maximum cycle life of 30 cycles unless 
specified otherwise by the battery manufacturer.  Nickel-metal hydride, nickel-cadmium, 
and lithium-ion (liquid electrolyte systems only) have a cycle life of greater than 500 
cycles.  Lithium-ion batteries have been shown to provide from one thousand to tens of 
thousands of cycles in portable equipment and satellite systems, respectively.  The 
service life of both primary and rechargeable may exceed the calendar life of the 
battery, and in those cases the calendar life becomes the limiting factor.   
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APPENDIX D: BATTERY DESIGN EVALUATION AND APPROVAL 
 
The process by which battery design and usage plans are reviewed and approved 
varies with each Center and from program to program.  This appendix will be used to 
collect examples of processes used within example programs.  It is merely intended as 
guidelines of how the approval process can be conducted. 
 
D.1  Example JSC Processes 
 
Battery approval should be provided via a signed battery evaluation form (e.g., ISS_EP-
03 for NASA Safety Panels).  The only exception to this is in cases where the battery is 
the main power supply for a space vehicle that is designed and flown by a prime 
contractor.  In this case, the responsible battery safety expert should verify that the 
design is safe through the appropriate safety panel review processes.  Approval of a 
battery design for a particular hardware or mission will not be construed as a general 
certification for all hardware and missions.  Approval of battery usage should be 
obtained for any new application of any approved hardware configuration and/or with 
each increase in scope of its certification.  The process for obtaining battery design 
evaluation and approval from JSC is detailed in JWI 8705.3.  The safety review process 
for the ISS and all the visiting vehicles is described in SSP 30599.  The safety review 
process for the Commercial Crew and Cargo Program is described in the CCT-STD-
1140 and  
CCT-REQ-1130 documents.  The Payload Safety Review policy and data submittal 
requirements are provided in SSP 30599 and SSP 51700. 
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APPENDIX E: REQUIREMENTS MATRIX 
 
Requirement 
Number 
Requirement Language Section Page Number
1.1 Evaluation of the design and verification program 
results shall be completed prior to certification for 
flight and ground operations. 
1.0 Introduction;  
1.1 Purpose and Scope 
1 
1.3 To be compliant to the requirements herein, 
every battery design, along with its safety 
verification program, its ground and/or on-orbit 
usage plans, and its post-flight processing shall 
be evaluated and approved by the appropriate 
technical review panel in the given program or 
project.   
1.0 Introduction;  
1.3 Battery Design 
Evaluation and Approval 
2 
4.1.1a Battery systems for crewed spacecraft shall 
implement failure tolerance as the preferred 
approach to control all catastrophic hazard 
causes. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.1 
Methodologies used in 
Ensuring Safe Outcomes; 
4.1.1 Failure Tolerance 
12 
4.1.1b The level of failure tolerance shall be the product 
of an integrated design and safety analysis but 
shall be a minimum of one. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.1 
Methodologies used in 
Ensuring Safe Outcomes; 
4.1.1 Failure Tolerance 
12 
4.1.2a The DFMR approach shall be used to address 
catastrophic battery hazards that cannot 
practically be controlled by a failure tolerance 
approach 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.1 
Methodologies used in 
Ensuring Safe Outcomes; 
4.1.2 Design for Minimum 
Risk 
13 
4.1.3 Risk Classification 4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.1 
Methodologies used in 
Ensuring Safe Outcomes; 
4.1.3 Risk Classification 
13 
4.2.1a Cell and battery designs considered for flight 
shall first undergo evaluation testing to 
characterize the performance and safety of the 
flight battery design. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, 
and Acceptance Testing; 
4.2.1 Engineering 
Evaluation
15 
4.2.1b Evaluation testing shall, at a minimum, consist of 
characterizing the cell and battery safety under 
abuse conditions of overcharge, over-discharge 
into reversal, external short circuit and cell 
internal short circuit, temperature tolerance, vent 
and burst pressure determination and for 
critical/catastrophic batteries (See 4.1.3) perform 
cell destructive physical analysis. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, 
and Acceptance Testing; 
4.2.1 Engineering 
Evaluation 
15 
4.2.1c Evaluation testing shall confirm manufacturer’s 
specifications that are relevant to the project, as 
well as confirm that the cell and/or battery design 
can handle unique requirements levied by the 
project. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, 
and Acceptance Testing; 
4.2.1 Engineering 
Evaluation
15 
JSC-20793 Rev D 
106 
See cover for full disclosure. Verify correct revision before use at 
https://qmsmasterlist.jsc.nasa.gov/Home.aspx/Organization/31. 
4.2.2a Qualification testing shall be performed to the 
worst-case relevant flight environments with 
margin. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, 
and Acceptance Testing; 
4.2.2 Qualification Testing 
16 
4.2.2b Environmental tests shall include, at a minimum, 
extreme temperature exposures, vacuum, and 
vibration tests. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, 
and Acceptance Testing; 
4.2.2 Qualification Testing 
16 
4.2.2c Flight cell lot destructive testing shall consume a 
randomly selected sample size that is, at 
minimum, 3 percent of the flight lot size or three 
cells, whichever is greater for each destructive 
test. The destructive test sample size need not 
exceed 350 cells. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, 
and Acceptance Testing; 
4.2.2 Qualification Testing 
17 
4.2.2d The operation of cell safety devices, if used as a 
control at the battery level, shall be verified by a 
qualification test at the battery level or at a level 
that accurately simulates the level at which the 
control is required to confirm the operation of the 
safety device.  
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, 
and Acceptance Testing; 
4.2.2 Qualification Testing 
17 
4.2.2e To verify cell manufacturing quality does not vary 
within the lot, cell lot destructive testing shall 
include a minimum of 3 randomly selected cells 
(or 3 cells from 1 randomly selected COTS 
battery) that has passed cell (or battery) 
acceptance screening. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, 
and Acceptance Testing; 
4.2.2 Qualification Testing 
17 
4.2.2f Qualification testing shall be performed at the 
battery level, using flight equivalent builds. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, 
and Acceptance Testing; 
4.2.2 Qualification Testing 
17 
4.2.3a Cell lots intended for custom flight batteries shall 
undergo 100-percent acceptance screening that 
includes, at minimum, visual inspection of bare 
cell with shrink wrap removed if present, mass, 
OCV retention, alternating current (AC) and direct 
current (DC) resistance. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, 
and Acceptance Testing; 
4.2.3 Acceptance Testing 
17 
4.2.3b Batteries intended for flight shall undergo flight 
acceptance (nondestructive) testing, which will 
include an evaluation of OCV, mass, capacity (for 
rechargeable chemistries) or load check (for 
primaries), internal resistance, visual inspection, 
vibration to flight acceptance levels, and 
thermal/vacuum testing. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.2 Key 
Aspects of Engineering 
Evaluation, Qualification, 
and Acceptance Testing; 
4.2.3 Acceptance Testing 
18 
4.3.1a Custom cell and battery designs intended for 
flight shall only be procured from vendors with 
configuration control processes approved by the 
NASA or International Partner program. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.3 
Manufacturing Quality; 
4.3.1 Configuration 
Control
18 
4.3.2a Any new COTS battery lot and/or cell date code 
shall require a repeat of all battery and/or cell lot 
qualification testing and mitigation measures 
specified in Section 4.2.2. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.3 
Manufacturing Quality; 
4.3.2 Subsequent Flight 
Lot Testing 
19 
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4.3.2b Subsequent flight cell lot destructive testing shall 
confirm that subsequent lot performance and 
safety features are the same as that of the 
original qualification lot. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.3 
Manufacturing Quality; 
4.3.2 Subsequent Flight 
Lot Testing 
19 
4.4.1a The electrical interconnections that form the pack 
through the interconnection of cells shall be made 
of low-resistance connections such that ohmic 
heating at the design load presents no over-
temperature hazard. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 
General Design 
Requirements; 4.4.1 
Electrical Interconnection 
20 
4.4.1b The means of interconnection (i.e., mechanical 
fasteners, tack weld, etc.) and its verification shall 
ensure that the flight environments and usage 
profile do not reduce the effectiveness of the 
connection. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 
General Design 
Requirements; 4.4.1 
Electrical Interconnection 
20 
4.4.2a Wiring used within the flight battery shall adhere 
to Electrical Wire and Cable Acceptance Tests 
described in JSC-STD-8080.5 E-24 or be certified 
via an equivalent standard. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 
General Design 
Requirements; 4.4.2 
Electrical Wiring
20 
4.4.3a For custom or COTS batteries with catastrophic 
failure modes due to cell under/over voltage, 
monitoring shall be provided in order to detect 
and control hazardous under/over voltage of any 
cell in the battery. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 
General Design 
Requirements; 4.4.3 
Lithium-ion Battery and 
Cell Monitoring
20 
4.4.3b For custom or COTS batteries with catastrophic 
failure modes due to high currents, battery-level 
current monitoring shall be provided in order to 
detect and control hazardous currents in the 
battery. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 
General Design 
Requirements; 4.4.3 
Lithium-ion Battery and 
Cell Monitoring 
21 
4.4.3c For custom or COTS batteries with catastrophic 
failure modes due to high/low temperatures, 
temperature monitoring shall be provided to 
detect and control hazardous temperatures at 
any cell in the battery. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 
General Design 
Requirements; 4.4.3 
Lithium-ion Battery and 
Cell Monitoring 
21 
4.4.3d For custom battery designs with catastrophic 
failure modes, instrumentation shall collect data 
during use and during charge and be reviewable 
on the ground for use in trending and/or post 
anomaly analysis. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 
General Design 
Requirements; 4.4.3 
Lithium-ion Battery and 
Cell Monitoring
21 
4.4.4a For custom batteries with catastrophic failure 
modes, cell performance matching prior to battery 
assembly shall be performed to mitigate state-of-
charge (SOC) imbalances that could adversely 
affect battery performance and/or safety. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 
General Design 
Requirements; 4.4.4 Cell 
Matching 
21 
4.4.4b For custom batteries with catastrophic failure 
modes, cells shall be matched in a battery based 
on charge retention, internal resistance and/or 
AC impedance, and ampere-hour capacity (for 
rechargeable chemistries). 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 
General Design 
Requirements; 4.4.4 Cell 
Matching 
21 
4.4.5a For custom batteries with catastrophic failure 
modes, software-based controls responsible for 
managing the charge/discharge of the battery 
shall operate inside a safe envelope maintained 
by active or passive hardware-based controls and 
guards. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 
General Design 
Requirements; 4.4.5 
Dissimilar Controls 
22 
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4.4.5b For custom batteries with catastrophic failure 
modes, in cases where software-based controls 
are not enveloped by hardware controls, the 
software is safety critical and its development 
shall include conventional software assurance 
processes and confidence not based solely on 
integrated testing.  
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.4 
General Design 
Requirements; 4.4.5 
Dissimilar Controls 
22 
4.5a During the preparation phase for on-orbit 
processing, the hardware owner shall provide 
details for safe operation of the hardware on-
orbit, any on-orbit processing that may be 
required, and safe stowage or disposal. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.5 Mission 
Usage 
22 
4.5b The hardware owner shall establish on-orbit 
processes and operational constraints in 
coordination with the mission controllers for the 
hardware. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.5 Mission 
Usage 
22 
4.5c For the custom lithium-ion battery designs that 
are designated as catastrophic (see 4.1.3) and 
required to be used in a crewed environment for 
more than 1 year or for multiple missions 
requiring launch and landing, the health of the 
battery shall be monitored to allow insight into 
changes that could lead to a catastrophic failure. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.5 Mission 
Usage 
22 
4.6a A post-flight performance evaluation of the 
hardware and the batteries shall be conducted 
when hardware is returned post-flight. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.6 Post-
flight Cell and Pack 
Evaluation 
23 
4.6b For cells and batteries installed in hardware 
during return flight, after the post-flight evaluation, 
the cells and battery pack shall be removed so 
that the equipment may be stored without the 
cells and pack installed. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.6 Post-
flight Cell and Pack 
Evaluation 
23 
4.7a The hardware developer or provider shall 
establish protocols and controls to address 
identified hazards and document those processes 
in the safety data package prepared for the 
system. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.7 Ground 
Processing Requirements 
23 
4.7b Battery system transportation shall be in accord 
with domestic and international regulations. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.7 Ground 
Processing Requirements 
23 
4.7.1a Sufficient ventilation shall be provided when 
processing non-sealed batteries to ensure that 
the concentrations of electrolyte vapors, 
combustible gases, or toxic gases do not reach 
50 percent of the lower exposure limit (LEL). 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.7 Ground 
Processing Requirements; 
4.7.1 Requirements for 
Ground Handling and 
Transportation
22 
4.7.1b Ground handling and transportation shall be in 
accordance with JPR 1700.1, “JSC Safety and 
Health Handbook,” or equivalent standards. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.7 Ground 
Processing Requirements; 
4.7.1 Requirements for 
Ground Handling and 
Transportation 
23 
4.7.2a GSE for batteries shall be designed such that the 
combination of the battery and GSE does not 
reduce the level of failure tolerance intended in 
the flight battery design. 
4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.7 Ground 
Processing Requirements; 
4.7.2 Design and 
Operations Requirements 
for Ground Support 
Equipment
24 
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4.8a Shelf and service life of batteries shall be tracked. 4.0 General Battery 
Requirements; 4.8 Shelf 
and Service Life Related 
Requirements
25 
5.0a The possible sources of battery hazards shall be 
identified for each battery design while 
considering the entire set of mission phases and 
conditions. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls 
26 
5.0b Each hazard shall be evaluated to determine 
applicability and to identify all sources, which can 
be broadly categorized as inadequate design, 
poor workmanship, and/or abuse (electrical, 
mechanical, and/or thermal). 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls 
26 
5.0c The hazard severity shall be categorized as 
catastrophic, critical, or non-critical. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls 
26 
5.1.1.1a Design of the hardware shall limit accumulation of 
hydrogen in enclosed spaces containing oxygen 
to less than 2 percent of the total free-space 
volume. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.1 Sources – Chemical 
Reaction; 5.1.1.1 
Requirements – Chemical 
Reaction
27 
5.1.1.1b Electrolyte absorbing materials used in battery 
designs shall be nonflammable or flame 
retardant. 
 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.1 Sources – Chemical 
Reaction; 5.1.1.1 
Requirements – Chemical 
Reaction
27 
5.1.1.1c The battery enclosure and cells shall prevent 
excessive pressure buildup due to gas 
accumulation. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.1 Sources – Chemical 
Reaction; 5.1.1.1 
Requirements – Chemical 
Reaction 
27 
5.1.1.1d Relief valves and vents used as controls for the 
accumulation of excessive pressure shall be 
tested. 
 
 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.1 Sources – Chemical 
Reaction; 5.1.1.1 
Requirements – Chemical 
Reaction 
27 
5.1.1.1e If the battery cell enclosure failure mode is 
demonstrated to be leak-before-burst, then the 
ratio of failure pressure to vent pressure shall be 
a minimum of 1.5:1. 
 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.1 Sources – Chemical 
Reaction; 5.1.1.1 
Requirements – Chemical 
Reaction
28 
5.1.1.1f All other cell enclosures shall demonstrate 
a minimum ratio of failure pressure to vent 
pressure of 2.5:1. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.1 Sources – Chemical 
Reaction; 5.1.1.1 
Requirements – Chemical 
Reaction
28 
5.1.1.1g Cells that do not meet the 1.5:1 ratio shall not be 
used for manned space applications. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
28 
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5.1.1 Sources – Chemical 
Reaction; 5.1.1.1 
Requirements – Chemical 
Reaction
5.1.2.1a The battery/charger design shall maintain 
required failure tolerance against 
overcharge/over-discharge failure. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.2 Sources – 
Overcharge Failure/Over-
discharge Failure; 5.1.2.1 
Requirements – 
Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure 
29 
5.1.2.1b Operational procedures shall ensure that the 
battery is not operated outside limits 
recommended by the cell/battery pack 
manufacturer or that established during 
qualification testing. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.2 Sources – 
Overcharge Failure/Over-
discharge Failure; 5.1.2.1 
Requirements – 
Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure 
29 
5.1.2.1c The charger shall be designed for the specific 
type of battery being used and incorporate the 
necessary charge termination controls 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.2 Sources – 
Overcharge Failure/Over-
discharge Failure; 5.1.2.1 
Requirements – 
Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure
29 
5.1.2.1d Inadvertent charging of primary batteries shall be 
prevented 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.2 Sources – 
Overcharge Failure/Over-
discharge Failure; 5.1.2.1 
Requirements – 
Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure
29 
5.1.2.1e Uncontrolled charging of secondary batteries 
shall be prevented. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.2 Sources – 
Overcharge Failure/Over-
discharge Failure; 5.1.2.1 
Requirements – 
Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure 
29 
5.1.2.1f Charger circuit schematic shall be reviewed and 
evaluated for required failure tolerance. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.2 Sources – 
Overcharge Failure/Over-
discharge Failure; 5.1.2.1 
Requirements – 
Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure
29 
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5.1.2.1g For external chargers, the specification document 
for the charger shall be used as guidance for the 
development of in-flight charging procedures. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.2 Sources – 
Overcharge Failure/Over-
discharge Failure; 5.1.2.1 
Requirements – 
Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure 
29 
5.1.2.1h If it can lead to a hazardous condition, the 
charger shall be designed to stop charging the 
battery after a set period of time to prevent 
continuous balancing charge discharge loops. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.2 Sources – 
Overcharge Failure/Over-
discharge Failure; 5.1.2.1 
Requirements – 
Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure
29 
5.1.2.1i Operational tolerances of the charger shall not 
exceed the safe operating range of the cell or 
battery. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.2 Sources – 
Overcharge Failure/Over-
discharge Failure; 5.1.2.1 
Requirements – 
Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure
29 
5.1.2.1j Operational protocols programmed into battery 
chargers used on spacecraft shall have safety 
limits specified. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.2 Sources – 
Overcharge Failure/Over-
discharge Failure; 5.1.2.1 
Requirements – 
Overcharge Failure/ Over-
discharge Failure 
29 
5.1.3.1a External shorts to the battery shall be controlled 
using a combination of preventive controls. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.3 Sources – External 
Short Circuit; 5.1.3.1 
Requirements – External 
Short Circuit 
30 
5.1.3.1b Controls for battery external shorts shall be 
tested at the appropriate and relevant battery 
configuration in the relevant environment. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.3 Sources – External 
Short Circuit; 5.1.3.1 
Requirements – External 
Short Circuit
30 
5.1.3.1c The battery packs shall be tested for shorts 
(bypassing all battery level current limiters) of the 
low and high impedance types and provide 
protection controls accordingly.  
5. General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.3 Sources – External 
Short Circuit; 5.1.3.1 
Requirements – External 
Short Circuit
31 
5.1.3.1d 
 
The surfaces of battery terminals on the outside 
of the battery case shall be protected from 
accidental bridging. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
31 
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5.1.3 Sources – External 
Short Circuit; 5.1.3.1 
Requirements – External 
Short Circuit
5.1.3.1e All inner surfaces of metal battery enclosures 
shall be anodized and/or coated with a non-
electrically conductive electrolyte-resistant paint 
to prevent a subsequent short circuit hazard. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.3 Sources – External 
Short Circuit; 5.1.3.1 
Requirements – External 
Short Circuit
31 
5.1.3.1f Battery and cell terminals shall be protected from 
contact with other conductive surfaces. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.3 Sources – External 
Short Circuit; 5.1.3.1 
Requirements – External 
Short Circuit 
31 
5.1.3.1g Battery terminals that pass through metal battery 
enclosures shall be insulated from the case by an 
insulating collar or other effective means. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.3 Sources – External 
Short Circuit; 5.1.3.1 
Requirements – External 
Short Circuit
32 
5.1.3.1h Wires inside the battery case shall be insulated, 
restrained from contact with cell terminals, 
protected against chafing, and physically 
constrained from movement due to vibration or 
shock. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.3 Sources – External 
Short Circuit; 5.1.3.1 
Requirements – External 
Short Circuit
32 
5.1.3.1i Adjacent insulative barriers such as layers, 
wraps, and coatings shall be unlike in design and 
material properties. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.3 Sources – External 
Short Circuit; 5.1.3.1 
Requirements – External 
Short Circuit 
32 
5.1.3.1j In battery designs greater than 50 Vdc, corona-
induced short circuits (high-voltage-induced gas 
breakdown) shall be prevented. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.3 Sources – External 
Short Circuit; 5.1.3.1 
Requirements – External 
Short Circuit 
32 
5.1.4.1a Cells used in COTS batteries or cells selected for 
a custom battery shall be evaluated to ascertain 
the severity of an internal short circuit event. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.4 Sources – Internal 
Short Circuit Failure; 
5.1.4.1 Requirements – 
Internal Short Circuit 
33 
5.1.4.1b Measures shall be taken to reduce the likelihood 
and/or severity of an internal short circuit event to 
a level acceptable to the program/project. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.4 Sources – Internal 
Short Circuit Failure; 
5.1.4.1 Requirements – 
Internal Short Circuit 
34 
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5.1.5.1a For battery designs greater than a 80-Wh energy 
employing high specific energy cells (greater than 
80 watt-hours/kg, for example, lithium-ion 
chemistries) with catastrophic failure modes, the 
battery shall be evaluated to ascertain the 
severity of a worst-case single-cell thermal 
runaway event and the propensity of the design 
to demonstrate cell-to-cell propagation in the 
intended application and environment. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.5 Sources – Thermal 
Runaway Propagation; 
5.1.5.1 Requirements – 
Thermal Runaway 
Propagation 
36 
5.1.5.1b The evaluation shall include all necessary 
analysis and test to quantify the severity 
(consequence) of the event in the intended 
application and environment as well as to identify 
design modifications to the battery or the system 
that could appreciably reduce that severity. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.1 
Fire/Explosion Hazard; 
5.1.5 Sources – Thermal 
Runaway Propagation; 
5.1.5.1 Requirements – 
Thermal Runaway 
Propagation 
36 
5.2a An assessment shall be made by a toxicologist 
on the level of toxicity associated with the vented 
products of the battery 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards 
37 
5.2.1.1a Battery assembly shall maintain function and be 
safe after exposure to required vibration 
environments (e.g., SSP 41172, SSP 52005). 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards; 5.2.1 Chemical 
Exposure Sources – 
Mechanical Failure; 
5.2.1.1 Requirements – 
Mechanical Failure
37 
5.2.1.1b Battery assembly shall maintain function and be 
safe after exposure to required shock 
environments. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards; 5.2.1 Chemical 
Exposure Sources – 
Mechanical Failure; 
5.2.1.1 Requirements – 
Mechanical Failure 
37 
5.2.1.1c Battery assembly shall maintain function and be 
safe after exposure to required 
atmospheric/vacuum environments. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards; 5.2.1 Chemical 
Exposure Sources – 
Mechanical Failure; 
5.2.1.1 Requirements – 
Mechanical Failure 
37 
5.2.1.1d Cell and battery enclosure materials shall be 
compatible and ensure that the material strength 
and function are maintained after exposure to 
electrolyte liquids and gases/vapors, painted 
coatings, potting materials and their solvents, 
cleaning solutions, and cell case sealing 
materials and their solvents. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards; 5.2.1 Chemical 
Exposure Sources – 
Mechanical Failure; 
5.2.1.1 Requirements – 
Mechanical Failure
37 
5.2.2.1a A welded seal construction without softgood 
seals shall be used for all Li-SO2 and oxyhalide 
battery chemistries and be provided with a 
rupture disk or equivalent pressure-relief 
mechanism to provide for a leak-before-burst 
design. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards; 5.2.2 Sources – 
Seals and Vents; 5.2.2.1 
Requirements – Seals and 
Vents 
38 
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5.2.2.1b Cells with highly toxic or lethal electrolytes 
(greater than toxicology category 2), such as 
those in Li-BCX, Li-SOCl2, Li-SO2Cl2, and Li-SO2, 
shall not be used in or vented into habitable 
volumes. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards; 5.2.2 Sources – 
Seals and Vents; 5.2.2.1 
Requirements – Seals and 
Vents 
38 
5.2.2.1c Cell seals shall be 100-percent leaked tested at 
flight cell and/or flight battery level. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards; 5.2.2 Sources – 
Seals and Vents; 5.2.2.1 
Requirements – Seals and 
Vents
38 
5.2.2.1d Cell seal design shall have positive margins over 
cell vent pressures, as specified in 5.1.1.1e-g. 
 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards; 5.2.2 Sources – 
Seals and Vents; 5.2.2.1 
Requirements – Seals and 
Vents
38 
5.2.2.1e Cells with welded seals shall follow the 
requirement stated in AWS C7.4/C7.4M:2008. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards; 5.2.2 Sources – 
Seals and Vents; 5.2.2.1 
Requirements – Seals and 
Vents 
38 
5.2.2.1f Electrolyte absorbent material, containment, 
and/or a tortuous path for the exit of liquid 
electrolyte from the battery enclosure shall be 
used in the design. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards; 5.2.2 Sources – 
Seals and Vents; 5.2.2.1 
Requirements – Seals and 
Vents 
38 
5.2.2.1g All internal surfaces of a metal battery enclosure 
shall be anodized and/or coated with a non-
electrically conductive electrolyte-resistant paint 
to prevent a subsequent short circuit hazard as a 
result of electrolyte leakage. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards; 5.2.2 Sources – 
Seals and Vents; 5.2.2.1 
Requirements – Seals and 
Vents
38 
5.2.2.1h Vent holes in the battery enclosure, if present, 
shall be covered with a gas permeable/liquid 
impermeable or electrolyte absorbent, 
nonflammable material to trap released liquid 
electrolyte. 
 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards; 5.2.2 Sources – 
Seals and Vents; 5.2.2.1 
Requirements – Seals and 
Vents
38 
5.2.2.1i The seals of cell and battery designs shall be 
verified to work at worst-case mission operating 
conditions. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards; 5.2.2 Sources – 
Seals and Vents; 5.2.2.1 
Requirements – Seals and 
Vents 
38 
5.2.2.1j Cells with welded seal construction may also be 
enclosed in sealed containers.  If the sealed 
container is used as a control for fault tolerance 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards; 5.2.2 Sources – 
39 
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to a catastrophic hazard, it shall be verified with 
test. 
Seals and Vents; 5.2.2.1 
Requirements – Seals and 
Vents 
5.2.2.1k If a container with a welded seal construction is 
used to contain toxic gas from being released into 
a habitable volume, then the sealed container 
shall be compliant with NASA-STD-5019 or an 
equivalent standard. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.2 
Chemical Exposure 
Hazards; 5.2.2 Sources – 
Seals and Vents; 5.2.2.1 
Requirements – Seals and 
Vents 
39 
5.3.1.1a Batteries exceeding 40 Vdc shall provide hazard 
controls as specified in NASA-STD-3001. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.3 
Electrical Hazards; 5.3.1 
Sources of Electrical 
Shock, Corona, and Arc-
Flash; 5.3.1.1 
Requirements
39 
5.3.1.1b Batteries exceeding 100 Vdc shall be assessed 
for arc-flash hazards. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.3 
Electrical Hazards; 5.3.1 
Sources of Electrical 
Shock, Corona, and Arc-
Flash; 5.3.1.1 
Requirements 
39 
5.3.1.1c In battery designs where analysis shows an arc-
flash risk, arc flash and shock personal protective 
equipment shall be employed when working in or 
around the battery. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.3 
Electrical Hazards; 5.3.1 
Sources of Electrical 
Shock, Corona, and Arc-
Flash; 5.3.1.1 
Requirements 
39 
5.3.1.1d External shorts shall be controlled as 
documented in Section 5.1.3. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.3 
Electrical Hazards; 5.3.1 
Sources of Electrical 
Shock, Corona, and Arc-
Flash; 5.3.1.1 
Requirements
39 
5.3.1.1e Corona mitigation designs shall be incorporated 
as stated in JSC 29129 for high-voltage batteries 
used in a vacuum environment. 
 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.3 
Electrical Hazards; 5.3.1 
Sources of Electrical 
Shock, Corona, and Arc-
Flash; 5.3.1.1 
Requirements
39 
5.3.2.1a Batteries employed as the sole source of energy 
for critical safety systems shall be assessed for 
loss-of-power hazard. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.3 
Electrical Hazards; 5.3.2 
Sources of Loss of Power; 
5.3.2.1 Requirements 
40 
5.4.2a Battery thermal extremes shall be controlled 
during all mission phases to ensure that the crew 
is protected from extreme touch temperatures. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.4 
Extreme Temperature 
Hazards; 5.4.2 
Requirements 
40 
5.4.2b Battery thermal extremes shall be controlled and 
verified via test at worst-case mission 
environments to ensure that all cell temperatures 
remain within safe operating ranges specified by 
the manufacturer or verified by tests.
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.4 
Extreme Temperature 
Hazards; 5.4.2 
Requirements
41 
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5.4.2c External short circuits shall be controlled for the 
cells and battery assembly, as discussed in 
Section 5.1.3, to prevent heat generation 
resulting from high rates of discharge. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.4 
Extreme Temperature 
Hazards; 5.4.2 
Requirements 
41 
5.4.2d Validated thermal analysis and testing shall be 
performed to confirm that the battery cells will not 
be exposed to temperatures below the 
manufacturer’s rating or the limit established by 
qualification tests. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.4 
Extreme Temperature 
Hazards; 5.4.2 
Requirements 
41 
5.4.2e Thermal extremes due to thermal runaway 
propagation shall be addressed as discussed in 
Section 5.1.5. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.4 
Extreme Temperature 
Hazards; 5.4.2 
Requirements
41 
5.4.2f Battery heaters shall be designed with 
appropriate levels of failure tolerance to prevent 
excessive heating of the battery and/or cells. 
5.0 General Battery 
Hazards and Controls; 5.4 
Extreme Temperature 
Hazards; 5.4.2 
Requirements
41 
 
